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PURPOSES OF THE STUDY 
Many papers have contribute to the understanding of cash holdings for firms in the U.S.. The 
possible reasons are also suggested according to different authors. However, cash holdings in 
Europe have not been investigated even though ample firm data exist in Europe. My study attributes 
to the analysis of cash ratios in Europe. From my research, I notice that cash ratios increases 
significantly for firms in western European and Nordic countries from 1980 to 2009. This paper 
analyzes potential reasons that lead to the increase of cash holdings. 
 
 DATA 
The sample includes all Thomson One Banker firm-year observations from 1980 to 2009 with 
positive values for the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms incorporated in western 
European and Nordic countries. Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999) are 
excluded from the sample. Countries in the sample include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and United Kingdom. 
 
RESULTS 
My study shows that changes of some firm specific characteristics have the most influence on cash 
ratios. These firm variables include net working capital, research and development costs, and cash 
flow volatility. Even though previous literature suggests that agency problems can induce 
management to hoard cash. But in my empirical research, this hypothesis cannot explain the 
increase in cash ratios, at least, not from firms in my sample. 
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1 Introduction  
 
After releasing the second quarter’s financial statements, Apple Inc. announced its tremendous cash 
holdings of 76.4 billion US dollar, surpassing the cash reserves held by the United States 
government (73.7 billion US dollar). Other high-tech companies such as Microsoft and Google hold 
cash 58.8 billion and 39.1 billion USD, respectively. Moddy said the U.S. corporates altogether 
hold cash reserves of 1,240 billion USD at the end of 2010, 11% higher than the cash holdings at 
the end of 2009. So why do firm hoard so much in hand? Is that any better disposal rather than hold 
cash in hand? Would it cause too much attention from shareholders? 
A firm may accumulate cash for several motives. Perhaps the most recognized one is to minimize 
transaction costs. Transaction costs decrease the motivation for firms to raise funds from external 
market even if firms could have valuable projects to invest. Another motive to hold cash is to enable 
firms to keep investing when cash flows are too low to fund positive NPV investments. Obtaining 
cash from external capital market is costly for firms due to information asymmetry. For example, in 
an economic downturn, investors may not have perfect knowledge to distinguish whether the firm’s 
poor performance is due to general economic conditions or low growth opportunities for the firm. 
Consequently, to compensate the potential default risks, investors would request above-average 
return from the capital invested. Thus, external funds could be too expensive for firms if they do 
have valuable investment opportunities.  
Chundson (1945) finds that cash/assets ratios tend to vary significantly by industrial sectors. Baskin 
(1987) argues that firms may use cash reserves for competitive purposes. For instance, cash reserves 
can signal a commitment to retaliation against market encroachment and to enable firms to seize 
new opportunities quickly. John (1993) suggests that firms wish to hold more cash when they are 
subject to greater financial distress costs. He finds that firms with high Tobin’s Q ratios and low 
tangible assets are likely to hold more cash. More details on motives for firms to hold cash will be 
amplified later in Section 1.2. 
 
1.1   Mathematical model  
Opler, Pinkowitz, and Williamson (1997) develop a mathematical model that describes the general 
principle for firms to hold cash. In the model, a firm is short of cash if the general conditions are 
met. One thing to remind is that the model excludes many factors existing in real world. The model 
is just a simplistic model with very basic explanation power. But it can illustrate the most general 
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rationale for cash holdings. In a world of perfect capital market without information asymmetry or 
transaction cost, holding cash and cash equivalent is irrelevant since there is sufficient information 
on performance and conditions of firms to signal to outsiders. Thus, investors can make best 
decisions based on the transparent and sufficient information provided by firms. So they don’t need 
to price this corresponding risk in the risk premium. On condition that firms need to raise cash from 
external capital market to fund its investments and daily operations, they can do so at zero cost 
because there is no liquidity premium in such a world with perfect information. Thus, if a firm 
borrows cash and invests in liquid assets, the wealth of shareholders will not be changed. 
However, if it is costly for firms to raise funds from external capital market, the firms will weigh 
the marginal costs of holding one additional dollar against the marginal benefits of that one 
additional dollar. Holding extra cash reduces the possibility of being short of cash. The model 
provided by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1997) can be illustrated below: 
A firm is defined short of cash if it has to reduce investments, dividends, or raise capital by selling 
securities or assets.  
If a firm starts investments at time t in state of world s(t), the investment is I(s(t)). In state s(t), the 
beginning cash possessed by a firm is equal to the cash at the end of time t-1, L(t-1), plus the return 
on the beginning cash balance, r(s(t))*L(t-1), and plus the cash flow from daily operations, C(s(t)). 
As the same time, the firm must pay tax, T(s(t)), pay for existing debts, bonds or derivatives, P(s(t))  
and dividend d(s(t)).  
A firm is short of cash if: 
                I(s(t))>L(t-1)(1+r(s(t)))+C(s(t))-T(s(t))-P(s(t))-d(s(t))                            (1) 
And      ∂I(s(t))/ ∂L(t-1)=(1+r(s(t)))                                                                          (2) 
 
Equation 1 indicates that the firm exhausts all of the internally liquid assets available before 
resorting to external capital market. And equation 2 indicates that if the firm has more liquid assets 
on hand it would invest in the PNV projects. Models of optimal cash holdings can differ in terms of 
costs of being short of cash and in terms of marginal cost of cash holdings. 
The model offers several implications. The firm can avoid being short of cash in a particular state of 
the world by holding more cash reserves or by engaging in financial activities that reduce P(s(t)) in 
the same period. Hedging is an applicable and useful method that can reduce P(s(t))or even make it  
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negative. Besides, the firm can issue equity. So it can reduce payments to bondholders. As a result, 
an optimal theory of cash holdings has to highlight the issue of why it is more efficient to hold an 
additional dollar of cash rather than leverage or hedging. 
 
1.2 Motivations for cash holdings 
Ample empirical studies have focused on motives for holding cash. The most studied motives are 
precautionary motive and transaction motive. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1997) 
summarize and extend previous studies and they propose three classical motives for cash holdings. 
 
1.2.1 The transaction cost model 
Accessing external capital market is always expensive in real world. Afirm short of 
cash has to raise funds in the capital market, or liquidate existing assets, or reduce dividends, 
or renegotiate existing financial contracts. Unless the firm can liquidate the assets at low 
cost, firms generally prefer capital market. However, it’s expensive to raise capital from 
external market. The fixed costs of accessing outside markets induce firms to raise funds 
infrequently and use cash reserves in case of need. 
 
In a world with significant transaction costs, it’s reasonable to expect very liquid assets 
such as cash to have a low return because these assets can be exchanged into other assets at 
a low cost. As a result, it’s expensive for firms to hold cash due to the opportunity cost. 
Consequently, firms have an opportunity cost to hold cash. For example, the opportunity 
cost increases with interest rate if the firm holds its cash in the form of demand deposits. It’s 
especially true to hold cash and cash equivalent when the liquidity premium of the term 
structure rises. 
 
1.2.2 Information asymmetries and agency costs of debts 
Information asymmetries make it more difficult for firms to raise capital from external 
market. Outsiders need to be sure that they are not wasting or risking their money by 
purchasing overpriced securities. Since outsiders know less than managers, they will tend to 
underprice the securities given managers’ information. In fact, sometimes outsiders require 
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too much discount that the management thinks it’s more reasonable and profitable not to sell 
the stocks. Thus, we can see that information asymmetry makes external financing more 
expensive. So firms with little debt capacity left would resort to cash reserves rather than the 
informationally sensitive securitites. 
 
Agency costs of debt are another important issue if firms try to raise capital from 
external market. Agency costs emerge if the interest of shareholders differs from interest of 
debtholders and agency costs can deteriorate if the interest between debtholders varies. As a 
result, highly leveraged firms find it difficult and expensive to raise additional funds. 
Besides, firms may find it difficult or impossible to renegotiate existing debt agreements to 
prevent firms from default and bankruptcy. The controversy is that raising funds and make 
investments could only benefit debtholders rather than shareholders since debtholders own 
the priority when the firm’s assets are liquidated in case of bankruptcy. So shareholders may 
veto the investment opportunities even though these investments have positive net present 
values.  
 
In general, one would expect that large issuing of debts would be mostly costly for 
firms with high bankruptcy and distress costs. R&D expenditures are a proxy for distress for 
firms. Customers are reluctant to buy products or services from a financially distressed firm 
with highly specialized products that may require future services. If the firm is liquidated 
due to default on its debts, customers may not receive maintenance or warranty services 
anymore in the future. Thus, customers generally avoid high-tech firms that are too much 
leveraged. That’s why we can see many high-tech firms have little or no debts in the books. 
Opler and Titman (1994) suggest that firms with high R&D expenses to sales are more 
vulnerable to financial distress. 
 
1.2.3 Agency problem of managerial conflicts 
Management and shareholders don't necessarily stand the same interest. Management 
can hold cash for its own benefits. They can hold cash simply because they are risk averse. 
More entrenched management would therefore be more likely to hold excess cash. Besides, 
managers can hoard cash to make investments that external market wouldn't be willing to 
finance. However, these investments can possibly reward managers with better bonuses or 
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simply boost the ego the management. So, to avoid the disciplines of the market, managers 
can hoard much cash for their own purposes. Since the managers can do so, outsiders will 
raise the costs of funding because the investors do not know whether management is raising 
cash to increase firm value or to purpose its own benefits. What’s more, management may 
accumulate cash because it does not want pay out the cash to shareholders in the form of 
dividends in companies or countries where shareholders’ rights are well protected.  
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2 Literature review  
 
Cash holdings have been studied by many authors from different perspectives. If we refer to agency 
problems, the earliest literature could date back to Adam Smith who asserts that conflicts arise the 
moment ownership and management of companies separate. One of the most influential papers on 
agency problems is by Michael Jensen who shelter light on the problems for other interested 
researchers. More quantitative research on cash holdings comes later in the academic fields. Many 
papers provide mathematical models on cash flow volatility and hedging strategies. When referring 
data in western European and Nordic countries, I think one important issue in particular is the 
adoption of euro in January 1, 1999. Thus, the potential influence of euro on cash holdings is also 
provided in this section. Based on previous studies, I put this section into several sub-sections that 
can offer a smooth and reasonable manner to review the previous literature. These sub-sections will 
offer some insight on cash flow volatility, financial constraints, corporate governance, tax, 
dividends, and euro. 
  
2.1 Cash flow volatility 
Cash flows play an important role in the daily operations of corporations. Steady and sufficient cash 
flows can provide funds for further operations and repay current liabilities. Low cash flows may 
force companies to delay debt repayment or forgo capital expenditure. By enforcing sustainable 
cash flows, risk managers can add to the values of shareholders (Shimko 1997).  
 
High cash flow volatility implies that a firm is more likely to have internal cash flow shortfalls. 
Minton and Schrand (1999) find that firms do not simply react to the shortfalls by changing the 
timing of discretionary investments to match cash flow realizations. Rather, firms tend to forgo 
investment opportunities. Theoretically, firms could smooth internal cash flow fluctuations by 
resorting to external financial markets. However, Myers and Majluf (1984) show that external 
market is more costly than internal capital. As a result, firms that require more external capital will 
reduce their investments, all else equal. 
 
Cash flow volatility is not only derived from frequent cash flow shortfalls. It can be a result of high 
costs of access to external capital market. Volatility can affect capital costs due to capital market 
imperfections such as information asymmetry and contracting (e.g. debt covenants). For instance, 
analysts are less likely to follow firms with volatile cash flows, leading to greater information 
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asymmetry and higher costs of accessing equity capital for firms. So these two effects of cash flow 
volatility together imply that reductions in cash flow volatility through risk management activities 
can reduce a firm’s expected under-investment costs (Froot et al., 1993; Myers, 1977). 
 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) find a negative contemporaneous relation between annual 
investment levels and liquidity. Minton and Schrand (1999) suggest that cash flow volatility is 
associated with lower investment in average annual capital expenditure, R&D, and advertising 
expenses, even after industry-adjusting and controlling for the level of a firm’s average cash flows 
and its growth opportunities. Besides, they find that firms experiencing cash shortfalls in a given 
year relative to their peers or relative to their own historical performance have significantly lower 
discretionary investment in that year than firms that are not experiencing shortfalls. 
 
Shapiro and Titman (1986), Lessard (1990), Stulz (1990), and Froot et al. (1993) propose a link 
between cash flow volatility and investments to explain hedging activities that reduce cash volatility. 
Dolde (1995), GeHczy et al. (1997), Mian (1996), Nance et al. (1993), and Tufano (1996) find that 
firms that have the greatest expected benefits from reducing volatility are more active in risk 
management activities. Since investments are sensitive to cash flow volatility, would it be 
meaningful for firms to reduce or eliminate cash flow volatility? There is no definite answer for this 
question. Firms must weigh the benefits against the costs of elimination of cash flow volatility. Risk 
management costs vary based on different industries. For example, the risk management costs are 
relatively low for firms in the oil, gas, mining, and agriculture industries where liquid, well-
developed derivatives markets exist for a risk that represents a significant source of a firm’s cash 
flow volatility (Minton and Schrand 1999). Minton and Schrand also find that risk control costs 
tend to be higher for firms in which significant cash flow volatility is derived from factors that are 
relatively uncorrelated with interest rates, foreign exchange prices, or commodity prices.  
 
The positive relation between a firm’s current cost to raise funds and its historical cash flow 
volatility is a key issue for risk managers to focus on. Debt and equity holders use historical 
volatility to predict future cash flow volatility when they are pricing the financial contracts (Minton 
and Schrand 1999). This implication suggests that a firm’s cost of accessing external capital market 
will depend on how the expected of cash flow volatility will be in an extended period in the future. 
As a result, cross-sectional differences of effects of risk management will rely on cross-sectional 
differences between cash flow volatility and costs to access capital market. Minton and Schrand 
further explain that risk management activities, which are not expected to have a persistent effect on 
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volatility in future periods, will not necessarily reduce a firm’s current cost of accessing external 
capital market. To put further, debt and equity holders do not view the use of short-term financial 
derivatives to reduce volatility in the same way as the use of long-term risk reduction, such as 
moving a plant overseas to reduce foreign exchange price risk.  
 
Idiosyncratic risk in the U.S. equity market has increased over the last few decades (Campbell, 
Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001)). However, this trend in idiosyncratic risk has not gained attention 
until recently. One possible explanation is that firm-specific risks can be diversified away and 
therefore should not be a priced risk factor (ampbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001)). However, 
recent papers by Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) and Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) indicate 
that idiosyncratic risk may be a priced risk factor. Nevertheless, Bali, Cakici, Yan, and Zhang (2005) 
find that there is not a significant premium for idiosyncratic risk if the sample size increases.  
 
Many recent papers examine the determinants of the time trend in idiosyncratic risk. Beennett and 
Sias (2004) find that the growth of small firms, the growth of risky industries, and a decline of 
concentration in the same industry explains the time trend. Wei and Zhang (2006) find that 
fundamental factors, such as a decrease in net income and an increase in net income volatility, 
account for the growth in idiosyncratic volatility. They also note that new firms are more volatile 
than old firms. Malkiel and Xu (2003) suggest that an increase in institutional ownership, and an 
increase in stocks with higher predicted growth are all important factors for explaining the trend. 
Irvine and Pontiff (2005) as well as Gaspar and Massa (2006) find that an increase in competition is 
interconnected with the increase in idiosyncratic risk. Irvine and Pontiff extend that higher volatility 
of fundamental cash flows is connected with higher idiosyncratic volatility. Cao, Simin, and Zhao 
(2007) find that growth options explain the trend in idiosyncratic risk. Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 
(2005) show that decreasing earnings volatility and higher dispersion in analysts’ forecasts of 
earnings are associated with the time trend in idiosyncratic volatility, though they cannot explain it 
entirely.  
 
However, some authors question the existence of a time-trend in idiosyncratic risk.  Brandt, Brav, 
and Graham (2005) find that, during recent years, idiosyncratic volatility has fallen substantially, 
refuting any time trend evidence by Ampbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001). They also find that 
the rise of idiosyncratic volatility in the later 1990s and the decrease of idiosyncratic volatility in the 
2000s are most evident in firms with low stock prices and limited ownership of institutions. 
Consequently, they conclude that the time-serial behavior of idiosyncratic volatility is more likely 
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to reflect an episodic phenomenon than a time trend. Brandt, Brav, and Graham suggest that 
speculative trading behavior by individual investors in low-priced stocks accounts for both findings.  
 
Some research identifies a large number of factors that can explain the level of idiosyncratic risk in 
the cross-sectionally listed U.S. firms. Harvey and Siddique (2004) find that a number of firm-
specific factors can predict idiosyncratic volatility in the cross-section of firms. These factors 
include return on assets, firm size, trading volume, idiosyncratic skewness, operating leverage, and 
inventory growth. Pastor and Veronesi (2003) examine another model to investigate the hypothesis 
about idiosyncratic risk and uncertainty in valuation. They show that firms with greater uncertainty 
in valuation have higher idiosyncratic volatility and suggest that age is a good proxy for this 
uncertainty. What’s more, they find that younger firms have higher idiosyncratic volatility than 
older firms. However, their model does not have time-serial implications; in their model, the 
volatility of new firms does not show time-serial effects. Furthermore, their model predicts that the 
idiosyncratic volatility of a given firm should decrease over time, as uncertainty about its 
profitability decreases over time. Brown and Kapadia (2007) conclude that increase in idiosyncratic 
risk after 1950s is the result of the new listing effect: firms that list later in the sample period have 
shown higher idiosyncratic volatility than firms that list earlier. Besides, they find that firms that list 
in any given decade do not display a time trend in idiosyncratic volatility.  
 
 
2.2  Financial constraints 
A firm is financially unconstrained if it has sufficient capital to make valuable investments both in 
current and future periods. Consequently, a financially unconstrained firm has no precautionary 
motive for cash holdings. On the other hand, a financially constrained firm cannot make additional 
future investments without reducing or suspending current investments since the firm has used up 
the internal and external financing resources.  
 
Kim et al. (1998) argue that current investments and cash holdings are substitutes for future 
liquidity needs. They also predict that the current investment is positively associated with in cash 
flow volatility. However, Minton and Schrand (1999) find that higher cash flow volatility is related 
to lower average levels of investments. As a result, investment is negatively related to cash flow 
volatility. 
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Han and Qiu (2006) argue that a financially constrained firm increases its cash holdings when 
facing large cash flow volatility. But such behavior doesn't exist for financially unconstrained firms. 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) propose that investments will differ based on the available 
internal funds when firms face financing constraints. Zingales (1997) also finds that financial 
constraints could affect the link between cash flows and investments. 
 
Keynes (1936) finds that cash holdings allow firms to undertake valuable projects when these 
projects are available. He also argues that the importance of cash holdings is influenced by the 
extent to which firms get access to external capital market. If the firm is financially constrained, 
how to manage liquidity would be vital for the daily operation of the firm. But future investments 
and cash holdings become irrelevant if the firm has unconstrained access to external capital market.  
 
Almerda, Campellp, and Weisbach (2004) suggest that financial constraints should be related to 
firm’s sensitivity to cash flows. Financially constrained firms should not display a systematic 
tendency to save cash while financially constrained firms should be sensitive to cash flows. 
Consequently, the cash flow sensitivity of cash provides a theoretically justifiable and empirically 
implementable measure of financial constraints. 
 
2.3  Corporate governance 
In the 1970s, the sense of shareholder protection was not yet strong on shareholders’ minds. And 
proxy fights and hostile takeovers were rare. Thus, management had more power over the corporate 
issues than today. Then in 1980s, the rise of junk bond market enabled hostile takeovers even for 
the largest public firms. To defend themselves, many firms initiated anti-takeover defenses and 
other restrictions on shareholders. During the same period, many countries passed anti-takeover 
laws, providing firms more legal assistance against hostile takeovers. By 1990, the takeover market 
gradually cooled down. But the strength of shareholder rights has enhanced significantly since then. 
Some authors find that antitakeover provisions shelter management from the scrutiny and discipline 
of the market from corporate control. Thus, the agency problem between shareholders and 
managers has become a big issue of corporate governance. 
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Adam Smith explains that (due to the separation of ownership and control) “negligence and 
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such 
companies”. Shareholder rights are the core issues in corporate governance. And the agency 
problems are the central topic for corporate governance. How to deploy internally generated funds, 
thus, becomes the key issue between shareholders and management (Jensen 1986). Corporate 
governance should develop a device to control management to highlight the problem. During the 
economic expansion, as cash holdings increase, management make strategic decisions about 
whether to distribute the cash to shareholders, use it for external acquisitions, or continue to hold it. 
It is not theoretically clear how self-interested managers will choose between spending free cash 
flow and hoarding it as cash reserves. Managers must trade off private benefits of current spending 
against the flexibility provided by accumulating excess cash reserves. Further, self-interested 
managers must consider the choices between spending excessively and holding too much visibly 
since either action could subject the management to the discipline of stakeholders. 
 
One particular example of discipline of stakeholders is Kirk Kerkorian’s attack on Chrysler. In 1995, 
Chrysler Corporation was experiencing unprecedented success. It has an operating profit per 
automobile of 2,100 dollar, almost triple the number for Ford and General Motors. With this 
tremendous performance comparing to other firms within the same industry, Chrysler got 
tremendous attention from shareholders. At that time, Chrysler has 7.5 billion dollar as cash. This 
shining amount of cash makes the corporate the goal of takeovers. Kirk Kerkorian made a bid for 
the firm with 20 billion dollar. Chrysler eventually compromised by disbursing 7.5 billion cash to 
its shareholders. In return, Kirk Kerkorian withdrew his attempt to take over Chrysler. This 
incidence implies that hoarding too much cash can arouse much attention from shareholders since 
shareholders tend to think it’s a symbol of agency problem and they will demand managers to make 
proper investments of the funds or fire the management in question.  
 
Stulz (1990) develops the free cash flow hypothesis, predicting that shareholders will choose to 
limit managers’ access to free cash flow to alleviate the agency problems. The tricky part is how 
much internal capital should be allocated to managers to fund projects and acquisitions. Investment 
opportunities with positive NPV can enhance firm values while self-interested usage of internal 
capital by management can destroy values. Without a control threat, it is very difficult to convince 
managers to disgorge cash to shareholders.  
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Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick(2003) develop  GIM index model that provides an index to trace 
agency problems and shareholder rights. The general principle of GIM index is straightforward. 
Agency problem is severe if the GIM index is high while the problem is moderate and less severe if 
the GIM index is low. They find that each one point increase in GIM is associated with a decrease 
in Tobin’s Q from 2.2% points to 11.4% points based on different standards. Their finding suggests 
that financial market positively associate firm values with shareholder protection. 
 
One dollar may not be worth one dollar if there is a chance that it would be wasted. Since good 
corporate governance is the shareholders’ defense against the inefficient use of corporate assets by 
managers, an important question is that how corporate governance can impact the value and deploy 
use of cash reserves. 
 
Many authors have conducted their studies concerning cash holdings based on different 
perspectives. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smoth, and Servaes (2003) compare average cash holdings across 
countries with different levels of shareholder protection and capital market development. They find 
that firms generally hold less cash in countries where shareholder rights are well protected and 
external capital markets are highly developed. This indicates that shareholders want to limit the 
management’s control over cash and choose to do so when they have sufficient power. 
 
Lins and Kalcheva (2004) study corporate governance controls at country level and investigate how 
country-level investor protection marginally affects cash holdings. They find that firms with weaker 
shareholder rights hold more cash and this relation is especially true in countries with weak 
shareholder protection. In addition, they find that cash holdings are severely negatively related to 
firm value if the management has too much control over the daily operation of the firm and if 
shareholder rights are not well protected. 
 
Pinkowitz, stulz, and Williamson (2004) examine the effect of country-level protection of rights on 
cash holdings and show that cash is worth less to the minority shareholders of firms in countries 
with low investor protection. Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Ervaes (2003) and Luns and Kalcheva 
(2004) find that firms generally hold less cash in countries with better shareholder protection. 
 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999), and Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) show that 
firms have an optimal level of cash holdings and firms will trade off the costs and benefits of 
holding cash to reach the appropriate level. Consistent with previous studies of agency problems, 
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they find that investors in countries with below median governance scores place a lower value (0.33 
dollar) on a dollar that firms hold than investors in countries with above median governance 
scores( 0.91 dollar). 
 
All these studies suggest that firms with low level of shareholder protection tend to hoard cash 
rather than distribute the cash to shareholders. However, some other empirical studies show the 
opposite results that shelter new understanding on the topic. 
 
Harforda, Mansib, and Maxwelle (2007) show that firms with weaker shareholder rights and low 
insider ownership have lower level of cash holdings than those with stronger shareholder rights and 
high insider ownership. The authors also provide potential reasons. For a given set of firms with 
high levels of cash, all else equal, the firms with weaker governance will spend cash more quickly 
than those with stronger governance. The authors find that this spending is on acquisitions and 
capital expenditures rather than on R&D.  
 
Bliss and Rosen (2001) and Harford and Li (2007) show that for CEO compensation and wealth 
increase after investments such as acquisitions and large capital expenditures even if these 
investments destroy value. Given these incentives and the potential discipline arising from 
accumulating too much cash, weakly controlled managers choose to spend the cash quickly on 
acquisitions or capital expenditures. Mikkelson and Partch (2003) show that the persistent cash 
holdings do not lead to poor performance and do not represent conflicts between shareholders and 
managers. Similar research is ample. Harford (1999) suggests that it’s reasonable for shareholders 
to be concerned about managers’ stewardship of large internal cash reserves. He finds that cash-rich 
firms are more likely to make acquisitions and their acquisitions are more likely to be value-
destroying.  
 
Faleye (2004) suggests that proxy contests are increasing in excess cash reserves and that managers 
often lose their jobs following such contests. Thus, managers would prefer to convert the cash into 
real assets relatively quickly through investments or acquisitions. Even if these transactions destroy 
value, as long as management carries it out within boundary of being fired by shareholders, 
managers can successfully execute them. Despite the value-destroying activities, management can 
increase their personal compensation by stock options or bonuses. Given these incentives and the 
potential penalty from accumulating large cash reserves, weakly controlled managers choose to 
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spend the cash quickly on acquisitions and capital expenditures, rather than hoard it. Harford, Mansi, 
and Maxwell (2005) also find that poorly governed firms dissipate cash through acquisitions. 
 
2.4  Dividends 
Dividends are the agreement between shareholders and management. Firms are not obliged to pay 
dividends if they have not decided to pay. But dividend payment becomes a liability for the firm if 
the management has announced the plan to distribute dividends. Dividends can be proxies of the 
firm’s performance. If the firm is not making any profit, there is low chance for it to pay dividends. 
If a firm suddenly cut its dividends, it's a symbol of the turning point of the profitability of the firm. 
Dividends are always one study area of corporate governance.  Fama and French (2000) show that 
firms that have never paid dividends are more profitable than former payers who cut their dividends 
later on. Besides, they also have greater growth opportunities. On the other hand, dividend payers 
are more profitable than firms that have never paid. The typical firms that have never paid are that 
these firms generally invest at a higher rate, do more R&D, and have a higher Tobin’s Q value.  
 
Fama and French (2000) empirically investigate dividends for firms listed on NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ. They find that firms that pay dividends decreased from 66.5% to 20.8% for non-
financial and non-utility firms during the sample period. They authors suggest that the decreased 
rate of dividend payment is due to the new listing effects. They argue that the new-listed firms that 
have never paid dividends are small sized, have low earnings, and invest a lot comparing to their 
earnings. Fama and French also assert that the benefits of dividends have declined over time. 
Managers who hold large amounts of stocks prefer capital gains to dividends. Better corporate 
governance methods (e.g. innovative stock options) decrease the advantages of dividends in 
controlling agency problems between shareholders and management. 
 
Some authors study the behavior of dividend payment from the perspective of managerial 
entrenchment. Fama and French (2001) argue that, benefits by investigating U.S. industrial firms 
between 1980s and 1990s, managers dislike dividends since persistent dividend payments 
tremendously decrease their ability to go after their personal compensation. However, Carrie Pan 
(2007) finds that firms with entrenched managers are more likely to pay dividends. She also 
provides potential reason for this behavior. She asserts that firms choose a combination of anti-
takeover provisions and payout policy to enhance value. Both anti-takeover provisions and large 
cash holdings can help deter hostile takeovers. But large cash holdings can cause great agency 
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problems, especially for firms with high free cash flows and weak investment opportunities. 
However, paying too much cash to shareholders increases the risks of hostile takeover. Thus, by 
adopting anti-takeover provisions, firms with low investment opportunities can induce managers to 
disgorge cash by paying out dividends rather than hoard cash.  
 
2.5  Tax 
Apple has nearly 50 billion cash in countries beyond its home borders. Like other U.S. companies, 
it prefers to keep its foreign earnings offshore rather than bring them home and pay tax. To attract 
cash reserves to flow back to the U.S., the Bush government has implemented new law to determine 
the rate of tax for cash retained in foreign countries.  In October 2004, American Congress passed 
the American Job Creation Act, which allows an 85% tax deduction for repatriated earnings. This 
suggests a change of tax for foreign earnings from 35% to maximum 5.25%. As a  result, U.S. 
multinational firms that held large amounts of cash abroad to avoid tax consequences could 
eventually let the cash reserved abroad flow back to the U.S., spurring investments and creating 
more job opportunities. Even though the obvious consequences have not been observed, it looks 
that high repatriation tax burdens keep firms to hold cash abroad. 
 
Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite (2007) find that the U.S. multinational firms that would induce 
large tax expenses by repatriating earnings have high cash holdings abroad. More specifically, they 
find that affiliates in countries with high tax costs of repatriating earnings hold more cash than 
affiliates of the same firm in countries with low tax costs to repatriate cash. The sensitivity of 
affiliate cash holdings to repatriation taxes is particularly important for technology-intensive firms.   
 
2.6  Euro currency 
January 1 1999 has witnessed one of the most important institutional changes in international 
financial markets: the adoption of euro. From the very beginning, the new currency has received 
significant amount of controversy. The euro-skeptics assert that the frustrating economic 
performance in Europe is due to the adoption of the currency. So a deep investigation of euro could 
cast the doubts away. However, a thorough analysis of euro is not quite realistic due to the short 
existing period of the currency. Besides, despite the criticism, many other countries joined 
European Monetary Union. January 1 2011, the latest member of EMU Estonia adopted euro. Till 
then, 17 countries joined Eurozone, with a population of 329 million using euro. 
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Euro plays an important role in the macro economy in Eurozone. Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2008) 
argue that euro can have on impact either on firms’ cost of capital or on expected cash flows. One 
chief component of the cost of capital is the risk-free rate. The real risk-free rate could possibly be 
changed due to the adoption of the common currency in 1999. The euro should have reduced real 
interest rates for countries that previously experiencing fluctuations in commodity prices. Alesina 
and Barro (2002) suggest that euro can be an effective commitment device to maintain monetary 
stability especially for countries that suffered from high inflation rates. Another way to reduce cost 
of capital is the reduction in risk premium such as currency risk premium. The adoption of euro 
eliminates this currency risk premium in Eurozone. Firms can eliminate entirely or partially their 
foreign currency risks by implementing currency hedging. However, if firms do not fully hedge, 
currency risk is priced in capital market (Adler and Dumas (1983); Dumas and Solnik (1995); De 
Santis and Gerard (1998)). The integration of financial markets could have lowered the cost of 
capital through risk-sharing activities (Bekaert and Harvey (1995); Stulz (1999)). Hardouvelis, 
Malliaropoulos, and Priestley (2006) find that, due to the news of euro, foreign equity holdings as a 
component of total equity holdings have surged for pension funds in euro countries while the 
portion of foreign equity has remained constant. Besides, the competition in financial market could 
also have an impact on the reduction of cost of capital. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argued that 
corporate bond issuance has tripled after the adoption of euro. As a result, corporate bonds provided 
an efficient source of funds rather than loans from banks. 
 
The adoption of euro could have significantly increased expected firm cash flows. Rose (2000) and 
Glick and Rose (2002) suggest that euro has a dramatic impact on improving the bilateral trade 
flows within Eurozone. Empirical study by Rose and Wincoop (2001) shows that intra-European 
trade has increased by 50% since the adoption of euro. However, more recent research shows that 
the impact of euro on trade flows has decreases over time. For example, Bun and Klaassen (2007) 
suggest that the euro has increased the intra-European trade by only 3%. Baldwin (2006) estimates 
that the increase in trade is 9% within Eurozone.  
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3 Hypotheses  
 
In this section, to investigate the potential factors that increase cash ratios, I will test several 
hypotheses provided by Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). These firm characteristics are first studied 
by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999). Bates, Kahle, and Stulz improved their model 
by adding a few more variables. All the variables to be tested in this section are market-to-book 
ratio, firm size, cash flow to assets, net working capital to assets, capital expenditures to assets, 
leverage, industry cash flow volatility, R&D to sales, and acquisitions to assets.  
 
The variables used (Compustat annual data items in parentheses) and the hypotheses are as follows: 
 
Market-to-book ratio 
Firms with better investment opportunities value cash more since it is costly for these firms to be 
financially constrained (Han and Qu (2006) and Almerda, Campellp, and Weisbach (2004) ) . Thus, 
these firms tend to hold more cash due to transaction costs. So the first hypothesis is that firms with 
high market-to-book ratio will hold relatively more cash.  
 
I use the book value of assets (#6) minus the book value of equity (#60) plus the market value of 
equity (#199 ∗#25) as the numerator of the ratio and the book value of assets (#6) as the 
denominator. 
 
 Firm size 
There are economies of scale to holding cash. As indicated by Harvey and Siddique (2004), large 
firms tend to hold relatively less cash comparing to smaller firms. So the second hypothesis 
assumes that firm size is negatively related to cash holdings. 
 
I use firm size measured as the logarithm of book assets (#6). The book asset is adjusted for 
inflation for firm size. The inflation index is provided in the appendix. 
 
Cash flow to assets 
Firms with higher cash flows accumulate more cash (Minton and Schrand (1999)), all else equal. 
The third hypothesis is that cash flow to assets is positively associated with cash ratio. 
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Cash flow is measured as earnings after interest, dividends, and taxes but before depreciation 
divided by book assets ((#13 –#15 – #16 – #21) / #6).  
 
Net working capital to assets  
According to Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009), net working capital (NWC) should have a negative 
relation with cash holdings since NWC is made up by assets that could substitute for cash. In this 
hypothesis, NWC is net of cash. 
 
I subtract cash (#1) from NWC (#179), so the NWC measure is net of cash. 
 
 Capital expenditures to assets 
If capital expenditures create assets that can be used as collateral, capital expenditures could 
increase debt capacity and reduce the demand for cash. Further, as shown by Riddick and Whited 
(2009), a productivity shock can lead firms to temporarily invest more and save less cash, which 
would lead to a lower level of cash. At the same time, capital expenditures could proxy for financial 
distress costs and/or investment opportunities, in which case they would be positively related to 
cash (Shimko 1997). As a result, it’s difficult to determine the relation between capital expenditures 
and cash ratios in this Hypotheses Section. 
 
I measure capital expenditures as the ratio of capital expenditures (#128) to book assets (#6). 
 
Leverage 
If debt is sufficiently constraining, firms will use cash to reduce leverage, resulting in a negative 
relation between cash holdings and leverage. However, Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) 
argue that firms with high leverage will hold more cash for precautionary purposes. At the same 
time, it will be more costly for these firms to access to external capital market. Thus, these firms 
tend to hoard cash for transaction motive. From this perspective, there is a positive relation between 
leverage and cash holdings. As a result, just like capital expenditure, it’s not easy to hypothesize the 
relation between leverage and cash holdings so far in this section. 
 
I measure leverage as the sum of long-term debt (#9) plus debt in current liabilities (#34) divided by 
book assets (#6). 
 
Industry cash flow risk 
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Industries that experience high cash flow volatility tend to hold more cash reserves due to 
precautionary and transaction motive (Minton and Schrand (1999)). So I expect there is a positive 
relation between industry cash flow risk and cash ratios. 
 
The detailed method to calculate industry cash flow risk is provided in the next section. 
 
Dividend payout dummy 
Firms that pay dividends are likely to be less risky and have greater access to capital markets. 
Besides, firms paying common dividends generally have a higher Tobin’s Q. And normally, there is 
less information asymmetry in these firms. So it’s less expensive for these firms to get external 
funding (Fama and French (2000)). Thus, I expect that dividends play a negative role in cash 
holdings. 
 
I define dividend dummy variable equal to one in years in which a firm pays common dividends 
(#21). Otherwise, the dummy equals zero. 
 
R&D to sales 
Firms that invest much in R&D tend to have a high financial constraint cost. So these firms tend to 
hold more cash (Keynes (1936)). Thus, I expect R&D is positively related with cash holdings. On 
the other hand, R&D consumes much cash. In this sense, cash reserves should be negatively related 
to R&D (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009)). thus, I have the third variable that is difficult to determine 
or hypothesize, at this stage, the relation with cash ratios. 
 
R&D is measured as R&D (#46) divided by sales (#12), and is set equal to zero when R&D (#46) is 
missing. Results are similar if we use R&D to assets. 
 
Acquisitions to assets 
Acquisitions serve a similar function as capital expenditures (Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009)). So I 
expect acquisitions should be positively related to cash holdings.  
 
Acquisition activity is defined as acquisitions (#129) divided by book assets (#6), where acquisition 
expenditures reflect only the cash outflows associated with acquisitions. 
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4 Data description 
 
In this section, I first describe the data in the sample. Then I provide average cash ratio for the 
whole sample period to see whether there is a trend of cash holdings. Afterwards, I investigate the 
cash ratio based on different standards to determine the impact of certain firm-specific 
characteristics on cash holdings.  
 
The data in the sample are collected from Thomson One Banker for the period 1980 to 2009. These 
data include surviving and non-surviving firms that exist on Thomson any time in the sample period. 
I require that firms have positive assets and positive sales to be included in the sample in a given 
year. I exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) because they may carry cash due to capital 
requirements by regulatory authorities rather than the economic reasons that is the focus of my 
study. I also exclude utilities (SIC 4900-4999) because their cash holdings can be subject to 
regulatory supervision as well. Finally, I restrict the sample to firms that are incorporated in western 
European and Nordic countries. Countries in the sample are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and UK. These countries have developed economy, in which sufficient firms 
are available for statistical analysis. Besides, they also have a relatively long history to trace their 
financial performance. Thus, I can obtain not only sufficient cross-sectional data, but also time-
serial data to conduct my study. 
 
4.1 The average cash ratio in western European and Nordic countries 
In this section, I investigate the average cash ratio, leverage, and net leverage for the sample. Table 
I provides the relevant information. The third column of the Table I represents the number of 
observations in each year. I measure the cash ratio as cash and marketable securities divided by 
total assets. The second column provides the average cash ratio for the sample by year. This ratio 
increases from 7.7% in 1980 to the peak 20.0% in 2005. The average of these ratios is 13.7%. And 
the median number of the ratios is 12.7%. The increase of average cash ratio is 123% from 1980 to 
2009.  
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To assess whether there was a statistically significant trend in the cash ratio, I estimate regressions 
of the cash ratio on a constant and time measured in years (not reported). The coefficient on the 
time trend for the average cash ratio corresponds to an annual increase of 0.37%, significant at 1%. 
The adjusted   of the regression is 85%. This evidence is consistent with a positive time trend in 
cash holdings over the sample period. However, the usefulness of the results of the regression could 
be only applicable during the sample period. It would not make any sense if I try to extend the 
results to a different sample. 
I now turn to the implications of the increase in the cash ratio by measuring leverage. The fourth 
column of Table I reports average leverage for the sample firms. I measure debt as long-term debt 
plus debt in current liabilities divided by book assets. Leverage increases dramatically from 1980 to 
2009. The average leverage is 27.8% during the sample period. From one un-reported regression, I 
notice that the annual increase of leverage is 0.9%, significant at 1%. When I consider the average 
net leverage ratio, which subtracts cash from debt, I get a somehow different perspective regarding 
the time trend in leverage for the sample firms. The net leverage is 8.0% in 1980 and increases to 
26.9% in 2009. Regressions on net leverage show that the coefficient is 0.55%. Thus, from the 
empirical result, we can see that the annual difference between leverage and net leverage is due to 
the increase in cash reserves. In Section 3.2, I will provide more information on cash ratio based on 
different methodologies to determine a more detailed explanation on cash holdings. 
 
Figure I. Cash Ratio, Leverage, and Net Leverage in Western European and Nordic Countries. The sample includes all 
Thomson One Banker firm-year observations from 1989 to 2009 with positive values from the book value of total assets and positive 
sales revenue for firms incorporated in western European and Nordic countries. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities 
(SIC code 4900-4999) are also excluded from the sample
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Table I 
Average Cash, Leverage, and Net Leverage Ratios from 1980 to 2009 
The sample includes all Thomson One Banker firm-year observations from 1980 to 2009 with positive values for the book value of 
total assets and positive sales revenue for firms incorporated in western European and Nordic countries. Financial firms (SIC 6000-
6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999) are excluded from the sample. Variables are defined in the Appendix. 
Year Average Cash Ratio N Leverage N Net Leverage N 
1980 0.0765881 389 0.1575787 390 0.0802402 389 
1981 0.0744875 403 0.1646846 404 0.0894982 403 
1982 0.0811218 415 0.1687164 416 0.0865082 415 
1983 0.0946583 454 0.1753295 456 0.0799867 454 
1984 0.1052377 515 0.1735591 516 0.067508 515 
1985 0.114055 570 0.1771198 570 0.0624219 569 
1986 0.1256534 658 0.1850516 658 0.0591853 657 
1987 0.1348641 1122 0.2227181 1125 0.0875261 1122 
1988 0.1260524 1384 0.2244787 1388 0.0980621 1384 
1989 0.1265841 1562 0.2401801 1566 0.1133813 1562 
1990 0.1205345 1645 0.2461465 1649 0.1254271 1645 
1991 0.1139382 1689 0.2559356 1693 0.1418223 1689 
1992 0.1135546 1719 0.2660529 1723 0.1523629 1719 
1993 0.1187327 1799 0.281196 1806 0.1628919 1799 
1994 0.122938 1829 0.2752724 1831 0.1521799 1828 
1995 0.119039 1843 0.2663044 1847 0.1473626 1842 
1996 0.1275482 2529 0.2579775 2533 0.1306477 2528 
1997 0.1383274 2983 0.2457285 2991 0.1076874 2982 
1998 0.1419193 3238 0.2264788 3243 0.0850395 3237 
1999 0.1555977 3319 0.2207336 3319 0.0659118 3310 
2000 0.1690532 3396 0.2205097 3397 0.0518114 3391 
2001 0.1602802 3395 0.2446228 3393 0.0843914 3389 
2002 0.1616558 3518 0.2878476 3514 0.1253902 3510 
2003 0.1696875 3676 0.3087218 3669 0.1394513 3665 
2004 0.1849076 3894 0.276947 3884 0.0928149 3882 
2005 0.2000763 4092 0.2441527 4081 0.0449944 4076 
2006 0.2008825 4157 0.2185214 4150 0.0183302 4141 
2007 0.1916993 4087 0.2493337 4073 0.0580919 4069 
2008 0.1685366 3836 0.2341924 3831 0.0657861 3827 
2009 0.1708631 3537 0.2594542 3535 0.08851 3533 
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4.2  Increases in cash ratios by total assets 
The evidence summarized in Section 4.1 illustrates a consistent increase in the average cash ratio. 
Previous literature review shows that firm size tends to have impact on cash holdings due to 
economies of scales and scope. Larger firms tend to have a lower ratio of cash reserves while 
smaller firms generally have higher ratio of cash. To investigate whether the increase in cash is 
related to firm size, I divide the sample firms into quarters each year according to the book value of 
their assets at the end of the prior year.  
 
Table II shows the average cash ratio based on firm size from 1980 to 2009. The size of firms is 
calculated this way: first, the total assets are adjusted for inflation. Then all firms are pooled 
together. Firms are divided into four sub-samples (Q) based the order of total assets. Q1 has the 
smallest firm size while Q4 has the biggest size.  Even though I obtained the firm size from the 
sample, the cash ratio is not available since the cash amount or the total assets are not registered in 
that year. Besides, in 1980s, data are too limited for my research purposes. So to make the analysis 
more meaningful, I require each sub-sample should have at least 10 observations. Thus, the time 
starts from 1999. We have a 10-year sample. Figure II illustrates the average cash ratio for firms 
from 1999 to 2009. The average cash ratio increases across each size firm size. But the increase is 
more pronounced for smaller firms. The cash ratio of small firms is well above 15% through the 
sample period while that for the largest firms is around 10%. I again make regressions on the cash 
ratio for each firm size and find a positive and significant slope coefficient for each, where largest 
firms have the smallest coefficient. Given this evidence, I conclude that the increase in cash ratios is 
not driven by the largest firms in the sample, and is more pronounced in small firms. The result is 
consistent with previous academic research. 
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Table II 
Average Cash Ratio from 1980 to 2009 by Total Assets 
The sample includes all Thomson One Banker firm-year observations from 1980 to 2009 with positive values for the book value of 
total assets and positive sales revenue for firms in western European and Nordic countries. Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and 
utilities (SIC4900-4999) are excluded from the sample. Firms are sorted based on their total assets. Q1 has the smallest amount of total 
assets while Q4 has the largest total assets. N stands for the number available in each category. 
Year Q1 N Q2 N Q3 N Q4 N 
1980 0.076699 388 0.033554 1 
 
0 
 
0 
1981 0.074036 400 0.134645 3 
 
0 
 
0 
1982 0.08054 412 0.160961 3 
 
0 
 
0 
1983 0.094422 450 0.121248 4 
 
0 
 
0 
1984 0.10518 509 0.110136 6 
 
0 
 
0 
1985 0.113827 564 0.135452 6 
 
0 
 
0 
1986 0.125437 648 0.122503 9 0.294153 1 
 
0 
1987 0.134911 1113 0.107451 8 0.301589 1 
 
0 
1988 0.126023 1371 0.113424 12 0.318414 1 
 
0 
1989 0.126656 1547 0.108029 14 0.274686 1 
 
0 
1990 0.120568 1625 0.112955 17 0.145581 3 
 
0 
1991 0.11408 1666 0.104337 15 0.116824 7 0.001758 1 
1992 0.113737 1695 0.101246 15 0.111772 8 0.003056 1 
1993 0.118746 1770 0.129349 18 0.110833 8 0.068177 3 
1994 0.122854 1800 0.137515 18 0.097144 7 0.140235 4 
1995 0.118966 1812 0.134677 20 0.083088 6 0.125934 5 
1996 0.127774 2495 0.112016 22 0.11627 7 0.099258 5 
1997 0.138628 2949 0.124574 19 0.098713 8 0.094491 7 
1998 0.142342 3198 0.120015 24 0.104967 9 0.071327 7 
1999 0.156394 3267 0.099452 27 0.11683 12 0.10785 13 
2000 0.170594 3332 0.087679 27 0.122268 17 0.06192 20 
2001 0.161627 4425 0.08714 33 0.139959 16 0.077536 21 
2002 0.16268 3454 0.114583 35 0.121527 10 0.083261 19 
2003 0.170427 3615 0.126201 33 0.1478 8 0.116604 20 
2004 0.185781 3832 0.138364 35 0.156763 6 0.111076 21 
2005 0.201516 4026 0.125894 33 0.111357 13 0.090371 20 
2006 0.202711 4080 0.10727 38 0.104096 16 0.098477 23 
2007 0.19338 4009 0.111544 40 0.117294 15 0.086695 23 
2008 0.170308 3755 0.087194 40 0.093426 14 0.081613 27 
2009 0.172432 3456 0.107021 43 0.108927 15 0.094828 23 
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Figure II. Average cash ratios by firm size quarter from 1999 to 2009. The sample includes all Thomson One Banker firm-year 
observations from 1989 to 2009 with positive values from the book value of total assets and positive sales revenue for firms 
incorporated in western European and Nordic countries. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) are 
also excluded from the sample. The cash ratio is measured as the ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value of total 
assets. Firms are sorted into quarters based on the book value of sample firm assets in the prior fiscal year. The first quarter (Q1) 
comprises the smallest firms in the sample, while the fourth quarter(Q4) comprises the largest firms in the sample. 
 
4.3  Increase in cash ratios by the payment of dividends 
I next turn to the role of dividends. From previous section, the literature review shows that firms 
have become less likely to pay dividends since 1980s. Non-dividend payers with poor growth 
opportunities will accumulate more cash. In Table III, I reproduce the time series of the average cash 
ratio for dividend payers and non-dividend payers. The average cash ratio for dividend payers in a 
sample year is the average cash ratio of firms that a common dividend during that year. There is a 
dramatic increase in the cash ratio among the non-dividend payers, but not among the dividend 
payers. The increase for non-dividend payer is more than 300% for the sample period. I made a 
regression about the time effects for dividend payers and non-dividend payers. The coefficients of 
time effects are 0.2% and 0.7% for dividend paying firms and non-paying firms, respectively. Many 
papers consider non-dividend paying firms to be financially constrained, suggesting that the increase 
in cash holdings is more pronounced in financially constrained firms. Precautionary motive suggests 
that financially constrained firms are more likely to accumulate cash. One method to retain cash is by 
avoiding paying dividends. 
 
 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4
28 
 
Table III 
Average Cash Ratio by the Payment of Dividend 
The sample includes all Thomson One Banker firm-year observations from 1980 to 2009 with positive values for the book value of 
total assets and positive sales revenue for firms incorporated in western European and Nordic countries. Financial firms (SIC 6000-
6999) and utilities (SIC4900-4999) are excluded from the sample. Firms are considered dividend payer if they pay common dividend 
by that year. Firms are considered non-dividend payer if they do not pay common dividend in that year. 
Year DividendPayer N Non-Dividend Payer N 
1980 0.043784 57 0.043784 57 
1981 0.081577 337 0.03829 66 
1982 0.090354 326 0.047306 89 
1983 0.102281 372 0.06008 82 
1984 0.113236 422 0.068943 93 
1985 0.12147 481 0.073983 89 
1986 0.133186 559 0.083119 99 
1987 0.142573 959 0.089511 163 
1988 0.130635 1197 0.096718 187 
1989 0.130935 1356 0.097947 206 
1990 0.125546 1375 0.095013 270 
1991 0.121107 1349 0.085494 340 
1992 0.124111 1272 0.083514 447 
1993 0.131589 1292 0.085971 507 
1994 0.131268 1406 0.095251 423 
1995 0.126878 1424 0.092397 419 
1996 0.133205 1853 0.112042 676 
1997 0.138587 2204 0.137595 779 
1998 0.133079 2334 0.164745 904 
1999 0.14029 2237 0.187245 1082 
2000 0.129117 1986 0.225304 1410 
2001 0.12878 1844 0.197731 1551 
2002 0.140291 1961 0.188564 1557 
2003 0.15414 2120 0.190871 1556 
2004 0.161448 2290 0.218401 1604 
2005 0.163919 2338 0.248272 1754 
2006 0.154881 2179 0.251559 1978 
2007 0.149029 2140 0.2386 1947 
2008 0.140994 1898 0.195511 1938 
2009 0.157063 1775 0.184765 1762 
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Figure III. Average cash ratios by the payment of dividend from 1980 to 2009. The sample includes all Thomson One Banker 
firm-year observations from 1980 to 2009 with positive values from the book value of total assets and positive sales revenue for firms 
incorporated in western European and Nordic countries. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) are 
also excluded from the sample.  
 
4.4  Increase in cash ratio by accounting performance 
In Section 3.3, we briefly talked about financial constraints. In this section, we will provide more 
insight in this field. Firms with negative net income are more likely to be financially constrained than 
firms with positive net income. The existing literature shows that the cash flow sensitivity of 
corporate investments differs for financially constrained firms. I therefore divide the sample into 
firms with negative net income and non-negative-net-income firms. I report average cash ratios for 
these subsamples in the last two columns of Table IV. The firms with negative net income exhibit a 
significant increase in cash holdings. The average cash ratio of these firms in 2009 is six times the 
number in 1980. Firms with nonnegative net income also exhibit an increase in cash holdings. But 
the time trend is remarkably lower. From one un-reported regressions on time effects on cash 
holdings, I notice that the year effects on cash holdings are 0.2% for firms with non-negative net 
income while the number increases dramatically to 0.8% for firms with negative income respectively, 
both significant at 1%. 
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Table IV 
Average Cash Ratios from 1980 to 2009 by Accounting Performance 
The sample includes all Thomson One Banker firm-year observations from 1980 to 2009 with positive values for the book value of 
total assets and positive sales revenue for firms incorporated in western European and Nordic countries. Financial firms (SIC 6000-
6999) and utilities (SIC4900-4999) are excluded from the sample. Firms with accounting losses at the fiscal end of the designated year 
are assigned to the negative net income subsample.  
Year Negative Net Income N Non- Negative Net Income N 
1980 0.039644 50 0.039644 50 
1981 0.034565 59 0.081335 344 
1982 0.037892 74 0.090503 341 
1983 0.049183 61 0.101717 393 
1984 0.065378 53 0.10981 462 
1985 0.05929 42 0.118411 528 
1986 0.085386 73 0.130678 585 
1987 0.092084 103 0.139188 1019 
1988 0.118538 97 0.126619 1287 
1989 0.093349 114 0.129201 1448 
1990 0.089144 211 0.125153 1434 
1991 0.084747 341 0.121323 1348 
1992 0.080079 447 0.125318 1272 
1993 0.080298 455 0.131744 1344 
1994 0.088112 305 0.129908 1524 
1995 0.093913 296 0.123847 1547 
1996 0.128888 466 0.127246 2063 
1997 0.163822 545 0.132628 2438 
1998 0.176297 674 0.132883 2564 
1999 0.205777 844 0.138486 2475 
2000 0.244668 1033 0.135998 2363 
2001 0.20786 1326 0.129787 2069 
2002 0.196366 1537 0.134725 1981 
2003 0.199689 1480 0.149468 2196 
2004 0.234441 1312 0.159738 2582 
2005 0.276436 1333 0.163183 2759 
2006 0.287998 1367 0.158199 2790 
2007 0.272244 1354 0.151795 2733 
2008 0.19802 1536 0.148847 2300 
2009 0.18285 1579 0.161197 1958 
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Figure IV. Average cash ratios by accounting performance from 1980 to 2009. The sample includes all Thomson One Banker 
firm-year observations from 1980 to 2009 with positive values from the book value of total assets and positive sales revenue for firms 
incorporated in western European and Nordic countries. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) are 
also excluded from the sample. . Firms with accounting losses at the fiscal end of the designated year are assigned to the negative net 
income subsample.  
 
4.5  Increase in cash holdings by idiosyncratic risks 
The precautionary motive for cash holdings predicts that firms in industries that experience a large 
increase in idiosyncratic risk should have a greater increase in cash holdings than firms in industries 
that experience a small increase in idiosyncratic risk. To examine this, I divide the two-digit SIC 
code industries (for example, if the SIC code for the company is 3432, I will choose the first two 
digits 34 to represent the industry) in our sample into industries according to their cash flow 
volatility over the sample period. I measure cash flow risk as the standard deviation of industry cash 
flow to assets. Like I put firms into four quarters by total assets, I divide firms into four quarters 
based on their corresponding cash flow risks. Based on the method provided by Bates, Kalhe, and 
Stulz (2009), I computer the standard deviation of cash flow to assets for the previous 10 years for 
each year. At least three observations should be observed for calculation. Otherwise, the firm-year 
data is abandoned.  I then average the firm cash flow standard deviations each year based on two-
digit SIC code. Table V shows the average cash holdings according to their idiosyncratic risks. Q1 
has the lowest idiosyncratic risk while Q4 has the highest. Regressions show that firms in Q4 have 
the largest coefficient 0.56%, which means the yearly increase of idiosyncratic risk is 0.56%. The 
time effect is 0.01% for firms in Q1. The clear evidence from the table is that the increase in cash 
ratios is concentrated in industries that experience a large increase in cash flow volatility.  
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Table V 
Average Cash Holdings from 1980 to 2009 by Idiosyncratic Risk 
The table summarizes the average cash-to-assets ratio for quarters of industries sorted by increase in idiosyncratic risk. We first divide 
the two-digit SIC code industries in our sample into industry quarters according to the increase in idiosyncratic cash flow volatility 
over the sample period. I measure cash flow risk as the standard deviation for the previous 10 years. I require at least three 
observations for the standard deviation to be calculated. I then take the average across the two-digit SIC code of the firm standard 
deviations. The sample includes all Thomson One Banker firm-year observations from 1989 to 2009 with positive values for the book 
value of total assets and sales revenue. Financial firms (SIC code from 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999) are excluded from the 
sample. 
Year Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
1980 0.0805839 0.0605476 0.0850422 0.0768263 
1981 0.0745677 0.0624338 0.0868931 0.075329 
1982 0.0792874 0.0712483 0.0951071 0.078487 
1983 0.0890782 0.0882158 0.1050754 0.0962467 
1984 0.0934173 0.0970962 0.1231553 0.1078079 
1985 0.1014132 0.1081447 0.1326089 0.1163049 
1986 0.10995 0.11724 0.1426878 0.1321373 
1987 0.1192347 0.1330005 0.1523119 0.1430105 
1988 0.1145034 0.1234198 0.1418273 0.1301737 
1989 0.116005 0.1181489 0.1366021 0.1400558 
1990 0.1135218 0.1115921 0.1249301 0.1351565 
1991 0.1030539 0.1060254 0.1193954 0.1283211 
1992 0.0998029 0.10011 0.1252929 0.1290404 
1993 0.1075583 0.0998034 0.1342984 0.1334042 
1994 0.105637 0.1053491 0.1426664 0.1347345 
1995 0.1083046 0.1046102 0.1280023 0.1322053 
1996 0.1079792 0.106607 0.1269758 0.1511709 
1997 0.1062792 0.1097881 0.1390701 0.1655216 
1998 0.1003475 0.1063572 0.1380273 0.1739824 
1999 0.0990145 0.1055673 0.1395328 0.1998353 
2000 0.0912515 0.1013242 0.1523513 0.2226433 
2001 0.0876269 0.0987291 0.1383874 0.2107964 
2002 0.0847296 0.1032998 0.1374059 0.208087 
2003 0.0891409 0.1073512 0.1396445 0.2166594 
2004 0.098908 0.1143148 0.149411 0.2361465 
2005 0.0992625 0.1182568 0.1694909 0.2527456 
2006 0.099988 0.1257719 0.1790604 0.2454958 
2007 0.1078583 0.1291524 0.1696291 0.2308564 
2008 0.0921656 0.1098931 0.1461601 0.2053468 
2009 0.0987748 0.1151314 0.1545426 0.2050039 
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Figure V. Average cash ratios by idiosyncratic risks from 1980 to 2009. The sample includes all Thomson One Banker firm-year 
observations from 1980 to 2009 with positive values from the book value of total assets and sales revenue for firms incorporated in 
western European and Nordic countries. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) are also excluded 
from the sample.  
 
4.6  Increase in cash holdings by foreign income 
Foley et al. (2007) note that multinational firms benefit from retaining cash abroad because earning 
repatriation would cause negative tax consequences. I use non-missing foreign pretax income to 
identify firms for which avoidance of taxes on foreign income might lead to higher cash holdings. 
There is no evidence that cash holdings increase more for firms with foreign income in the sample 
period. Table VI shows that the average cash ratio of firms without foreign taxable income increases 
from 7.8% in 1980 to 20.0% in 2009 and the cash ratio of firms with foreign taxable income is 7.8% 
in 1980 and increases to 16.5% in 2009. The yearly increase is 0.34% for firms with foreign income 
and 0.54% for firms without foreign income, both significant at 1%. As a result, it seems foreign 
earning repatriation doesn't play a significant role in cash holdings in western European and Nordic 
countries. 
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Table VI 
The Average Cash Holdings from 1980 to 2009 by Foreign Income 
The table summarizes the average cash ratio for firms that have and have not foreign income. The sample includes all Thomson One 
Banker firm-year observations from 1989 to 2009 with positive values for the book value of total assets and positive sales revenue for 
firms incorporated in western European and Nordic countries. Financial firms (SIC code from 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-
4999) are excluded from the sample. 
Year Firm with Foreign Income N FirmWithout Foreign Income N 
1980 0.0779761 326 0.0694054 63 
1981 0.0759175 332 0.0678008 71 
1982 0.0833032 349 0.0695867 66 
1983 0.0960552 409 0.0819618 45 
1984 0.1050991 491 0.1080723 24 
1985 0.1146094 549 0.0995613 21 
1986 0.1248567 635 0.1476486 23 
1987 0.13541 999 0.1304303 123 
1988 0.1232199 1205 0.1451204 179 
1989 0.1252436 1348 0.1350282 214 
1990 0.1191947 1399 0.1281537 246 
1991 0.1100635 1438 0.1361366 251 
1992 0.1121888 1447 0.1208204 272 
1993 0.1181069 1494 0.1217981 305 
1994 0.1236613 1502 0.1196157 327 
1995 0.1178903 1510 0.1242476 333 
1996 0.1274209 2189 0.1283679 340 
1997 0.1394961 2637 0.1294208 346 
1998 0.1423259 2872 0.138729 366 
1999 0.1579038 2951 0.137105 368 
2000 0.1670816 3086 0.18868 310 
2001 0.1580251 3074 0.1818762 321 
2002 0.1556172 3124 0.2095353 394 
2003 0.1658558 3242 0.1983111 434 
2004 0.1785249 3450 0.2345034 444 
2005 0.1941158 3616 0.2453564 476 
2006 0.195226 3640 0.2407078 517 
2007 0.1851033 3567 0.2369458 520 
2008 0.160729 3288 0.2153823 548 
2009 0.1653318 2985 0.2007743 552 
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Figure VI.  Average cash ratios by foreign income from 1980 to 2009. The sample includes all Thomson One Banker firm-year 
observations from 1980 to 2009 with positive values from the book value of total assets and positive sales revenue for firms 
incorporated in western European and Nordic countries. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) are 
also excluded from the sample.  
 
 
 
 
4.7  Increase in cash holdings by currencies 
In January 1999, several European countries started using the common currency euro. They are 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
and Spain. Then later on, Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia also joined Euro Zone. 
However, it’s quite difficult to put Greece into Euro zone because of the country’s economic 
performance. So Greece is not included into the calculation. Besides, the other countries that later 
joined in Euro Zone are also not included since this study focuses on western European and Nordic 
countries. After these countries joined Euro Zone, interest rates were reduced and also foreign 
exchange rates were eliminated. Thus, firms in Euro Zone have less motivation than before to hedge 
against unexpected cash shocks for currency risks. Thus I test the effects of euro currency on cash 
holdings. The control group consists of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK.  
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Table VII 
The Average Cash Holdings from 1980 to 2009 by Currencies 
The table summarizes the average cash ratio for firms that are in euro countries and outside euro countries within the sample. The 
sample includes all Thomson One Banker firm-year observations from 1989 to 2009 with positive values for the book value of total 
assets and positive sales revenue for firms incorporated in the countries adopting Euro currency. Financial firms (SIC code from 6000-
6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999) are excluded from the sample. Firms are regarded as Euro Zone firms if they are Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Firms outside Euro Zone are from Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK. 
Year Firm in EuroZone N Firm outside EuroZone N 
1980 0.091421 102 0.091421 102 
1981 0.066775 295 0.095554 108 
1982 0.071654 304 0.107053 111 
1983 0.08424 334 0.123657 120 
1984 0.09196 364 0.137245 151 
1985 0.100798 398 0.144732 172 
1986 0.107482 461 0.168176 197 
1987 0.122107 808 0.167691 314 
1988 0.114273 982 0.154827 402 
1989 0.115743 1090 0.151621 472 
1990 0.110714 1160 0.144023 485 
1991 0.103638 1195 0.138855 494 
1992 0.102872 1218 0.139525 501 
1993 0.105971 1272 0.149535 527 
1994 0.112494 1278 0.147162 551 
1995 0.108088 1281 0.144001 562 
1996 0.112577 1756 0.161558 773 
1997 0.124876 2097 0.170164 885 
1998 0.133331 2295 0.16282 943 
1999 0.14743 2311 0.174323 1008 
2000 0.156062 2305 0.1965 1091 
2001 0.144137 2209 0.190349 1186 
2002 0.143295 2166 0.191071 1352 
2003 0.149535 2151 0.198112 1525 
2004 0.157637 2163 0.218984 1731 
2005 0.165366 2156 0.238731 1939 
2006 0.167935 2114 0.234975 2043 
2007 0.165628 2051 0.217963 2036 
2008 0.150184 1944 0.187394 1892 
2009 0.15829 1802 0.183922 1735 
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Figure VII.  Average cash ratios by currencies from 1980 to 2009. The sample includes all Thomson One Banker firm-year 
observations from 1980 to 2009 with positive values from the book value of total assets and positive sales revenue for firms 
incorporated in western European and Nordic countries. Financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) are 
also excluded from the sample.  
 
From Figure VII we can see that cash holdings outside Euro Zone are significantly higher than those 
of firms in Euro Zone. But it’s hard to say whether the higher cash reserves lead to higher increase of 
cash holdings. From one regression that tests the time effects on cash holdings, the time effects on 
cash holdings are 0.30% and 0.37%, respectively, for firms in Euro Zone and outside Euro Zone in 
the sample, significant at 1%. From another regression, which includes time period from 1998 to 
2007, I find significant differences. Time effects on firms within Euro Zone are 0.32% while 0.74% 
for firms outside Euro Zone, suggesting firms outside Euro Zone are facing more systemic risks than 
firms within Euro Zone. Even through many countries adopted Euro in 1999, the information was 
already well spread in the financial market. Thus I assume the financial markets well adopted the 
information already in 1998. Besides, data later than 2008 are not considered due to financial crisis, 
which can cause other factors to disturb my results. 
 
4.8  Increase in cash holdings by agency problem 
Jensen (1986) shows that agency theory predicts that cash holdings will increase for firms with high 
free cash flows. Pinkowitz, stulz, and Williamson (2004) examine the effect that country-level 
protection of rights has on cash holdings and show that cash is worth less to the minority 
shareholders of firms in countries with weak shareholder protection. To test the influence of agency 
problem on cash holdings, I have one separate section to study the impact of agency costs. 
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4.9  Summary 
From a sample of firms in western European and Nordic countries from 1980 to 2009, I find a 
consistent increase in cash holdings over time. In particular, I find that cash holdings increase more 
in firms that are financially constrained as proxied by negative net income, than in other firms. 
Besides, smaller firms tend to hold larger cash reserves due to precautionary motivation. Similar, 
firms in industries experiencing greater volatility hold more cash on average. Further, firms in 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and UK, on average, demonstrate a higher increase in cash 
ratio. Detailed explanations will be investigated in later sections.  
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5 What causes the increase in cash ratios? 
 
In this section, detailed methods are provided to test the increase in cash holdings. Section 5.1 
investigates the relation of firm-specific characteristics and cash ratios and the time trend of increase 
in cash ratios not explained by the firm characteristics. Section 5.2 tests slope change of the demand 
for cash, which supplements the research of Section 5.1. In Section 5.3, Fama and MacBeth method 
is implemented to predict cash holdings. Within the same section, specific reasons are provided to 
demonstrate what causes the increase in cash ratios. 
 
5.1  Did the demand function for cash holdings change? 
In this section, I will examine whether the increase in cash holdings can be explained by firm 
characteristics and whether the relation between firm characteristics and the cash ratio changes over 
time. I start from regressions that relate the cash ratio to firm characteristics and investigate whether 
such regressions can explain the increase in cash ratios through changes in firm characteristics. This 
approach attempts to identify whether there is a regime shift in how firms determine their cash 
holdings. 
 
In my thesis, I adopt several alternative definitions of cash ratios based on the method provided by 
Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). These definitions include (1) cash to assets, (2) cash to net assets 
(where net assets equals book assets minus cash), (3) log of cash to net assets, and (4) cash to sales. 
Cash to assets is the most accepted and traditional measure. Cash-to-net assets ratio is provided by 
OPSW. However, this method can cause some problems. The cash-to-net assets ratio generates 
extreme outliers for firms with most of their assets in cash. I will provide corresponding solutions 
later. Foley et al. (2007) use the logarithm of the cash-to-net assets ratio. This approach will also be 
included in my analysis. However, Foley et al. (2007) notice that both cash-to-net assets ratio and 
logarithm of cash-to-net assets ratio generate extreme outliers. So will focus primarily on regressions 
using cash to assets as the dependent variable, but reproduce regressions using the log of cash to net 
assets for reference.  
 
The explanatory variables adopted in my thesis are motivated by transaction and precautionary 
explanations presented in previous sections. These variables are from the method implemented by 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999). I also incorporate a firm’s acquisition expenses to 
assets as an additional variable. According to Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2008), acquisitions serve as 
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the similar function as capital expenditures. So it would be reasonable to add acquisition costs in the 
analysis to investigate its possible impact on cash holdings. 
 
The sample includes all surviving and non-surviving firms available from Thomson One Banker in 
western and Nordic European countries from 1980 to 2009. However, the sample size significantly 
reduces when missing data are excluded from the observations. Besides, I made some statistical 
modification to the raw data to make the analysis more robust based on the method of Bates, Kalhe, 
and Stulz (2009). Outliers in firm-year explanatory variables are winsorized. First, Leverage is 
winsorized so that it is between zero and one. R&D to sales, acquisitions to assets, cash flow 
volatility, and capital expenditures to assets are winsorized at the 1% level, and the top tail of the 
market-to-book ratio is winsorized at the 1% level. 
 
In Table VIII, six models are provided to test the relations between cash holdings and firm 
characteristics. The number in the parentheses is the p-value. In the Model 1 of Table VIII, ten firm-
specific variables are tested to determine the possible relations with cash ratios. The signs of 
corresponding variables are generally consistent with my hypotheses except for three variables since 
the relations with cash ratios can be either negative or positive according to the hypotheses section. 
The coefficient of industrial cash flow volatility is positively related with cash ratios, significant at 
1%. It’s consistent with previous finding that firms in industries with high cash flow volatility tend to 
hold more cash to hedge their potential risks. Market to book ratio is also positively related with cash 
ratios. In the Hypotheses Section, it seems that this ratio could be either positive or negative. But for 
firms in my sample, it seems that capital market places a higher valuation if the firm holds relatively 
more cash. Firms with high market valuation tend to be firms with good investment opportunities 
and relatively high growth rate comparing to other firms within the same industries. So these firms 
are inclined to hold more cash for transaction motive. 
 
Firm size is negatively related with cash holdings, significant at 1%. The possible explanation is 
economies of scale and of scope. Thus, big firms generally hold less cash. The regression result is 
consistent with my previous analysis in Data description Section. Cash flows in negatively related 
with cash holdings, with a p value of 0.000.  Firms with high streams of cash flows are less 
concerned with urgent needs of cash. So it’s less expensive for them to approach external market. 
Thus these firms are less motivated to hoard cash. Net working capital has the largest coefficient 
among the ten independent variables and it’s significant of 1%. So NWC could influence cash 
holdings to a large extent. I will investigate NWC later in Section 5.3. NWC, when net of cash, 
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consists of receivables and inventories. They can relatively easily be converted into cash due to their 
high liquidity. So NWC is a substitute for cash, as evident from the regression.  
 
 Capital expenditure is also negatively related with cash ratios, significant at 5%. Bates, Kahle, and 
Stulz (2009) assert that capital expenditures provide collaterals that can be changed into liquid assets 
at a relatively low cost. Thus, these assets can play a similar role as cash, consistent with my 
regression result. Leverage has the second largest coefficient for these independent variables, 
significant at 1%. In previous section, the relation between cash holdings and leverage could be 
either positive or negative. First, if firms have cash, they will reduce their leverage since debts 
normally have a higher cost for the firm than the opportunity costs of cash. The other theory says that 
firms will accumulate more cash if they are too much leveraged due to precautionary motive. In my 
study for those firms in western European and Nordic countries, it seems firms prefer to reduce their 
leverage if they have excess cash. The significant coefficient on leverage could be that the 
denominator (total assets) is net of cash. 
 
 There are two distinct opinions of the relation of R&D and cash holdings.  Firms with high R&D 
expenditures are considered financially constraint. So these firms tend to hold more cash for 
unexpected needs of cash. But the other theory says R&D consumes much cash so that firms will not 
hold much cash in hand. From the statistical result from the Table VIII, it seems, at least for firms in 
the sample, that firms with high R&D expenditures tend to hold more cash. Financial distress can be 
more expensive for these firms than firms that invest less in R&D. dividend payment is negatively 
related with cash ratios, consistent with previous studies. First, constant payment of dividends is a 
symbol of strong shareholder protection. Management in these firms cannot hoard cash easily at their 
will. Besides, firms paying dividends are more profitable than firms that don't pay dividends. So the 
financial position of these dividend paying firms are stronger. And thus, the financial constraint cost 
is less for these firms. It’s somehow surprising that the coefficient on acquisitions is positive. It 
seems acquisition serve the similar function as capital expenditures. However, the coefficient on 
acquisition is positive, significant at 1%. The possible explanation could be agency costs. Managers 
in firms with strong shareholder protection generally face a dilemma that they intend to accumulate 
cash within the corporate rather than distribute it to shareholders in the form of dividends. However, 
shareholders constantly monitor the financial positive of the firm. They will discipline the managers 
if the managers hoard too much cash without proper action with the cash reserves, evident from the 
incidence of distribution of 7 billion dollars by Chrysler. Well informed with this knowledge, 
managers tend to use the cash for acquisitions even through these investments, on average, destroy 
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values. In return, managers get managerial compensation. Consequently, acquisitions are positively 
related to cash ratios.  
 
Model 2 of Table VIII uses logarithm of cash to net assets as the dependent variable. The result is 
similar to Model 1 of Table VIII except for the intercept of the regression and significance of 
acquisitions. In Model 2, the intercept becomes negative while it’s positive in Model 1. Acquisitions 
are still positive. But it’s not significant anymore.  The overall adjusted    of Model 1 is 0.366. It 
decreases to 0.332 for Model 2. As suggested by Bates, Kalhe, and Stulz (2009), the Model 1 that 
adopts cash to assets is more appropriate than other models.  
 
It is also possible that some factors other than those included in the regressions cause the increase in 
cash ratios. However, these potential variables are not included in Model 1 or 2 of Table VIII. I will 
try to provide more insight into this issue. But it’s difficult or inefficient to exhaust all those possible 
independent variables. So I use dummies to test the potential differences. Model 3 of Table VIII 
reproduces Model 1 of Table VIII, using two decade dummies 1990s and 2000s. These dummies 
could add some insight to the increase in cash ratios. Model 3 uses cash to assets as dependent 
variable. Adding two dummies increases adjusted    by less 1%. The independent variables have 
similar coefficients and significance as Model 1 of Table VIII. The 1990s dummy is positive, but not 
significant. The 2000s dummy is also positive, significant at 1%. Thus, it seems that there is an 
increasing trend of cash reserves not explained by firm characteristics studied in the model.  
 
Model 4 of Table VIII reproduces Model 2 of Table VIII with two dummies. The dependent variable 
is logarithm of cash to net assets. Acquisition loses its significance in this model, same as in Model 2 
of Table VIII. The other variables demonstrate similar results as in Model 2 of Table VIII. The 1990s 
dummy is negative but not significant. The 2000s dummy is positive and significant at 1%. Model 3 
and 4 of Table VIII show that, holding the ten independent variables constant, there is an uprising 
trend of cash holdings in the 2000s. But the effect on 1990s is less obvious. I will try to give one 
explanation in later section. 
 
Previous literature review shows that euro plays an important role in macro economy in Euro zone. 
Euro can impact firms’ costs of capital and expected cash flows. Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2008) 
show that, by using corporate-level data from seventeen European countries, the introduction of euro 
has increase Tobin’s Q ratios by 17.1% in Euro zone that previously had weak currencies. Rather 
than testing the effects on Tobin’s Q ratio, I’m primarily interested in euro’s impact on the cash 
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ratios in Euro zone. So I have one control sub-sample that has firm data from western European and 
Nordic countries that have not adopted euro as the common currencies. These countries are Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. To put these countries in a sub-sample, I use a dummy 
variable post-euro dummy, which means the dummy is 1 if the year is after 1998. Even though euro 
was adopted in 1999, but on 2 May 1998 European Council decided which countries were allowed to 
enter the final phase of the EMU. Thus, choosing 1998 as the first year of euro seems reasonable 
since I use the end of each year (31th December) for calculation. Moreover, the financial market was 
assumed to well adopt the news already. So it sounds justifiable to use 1998 as the first year in post-
euro dummy. If the country is one of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain, then the euro country dummy is 1. So euro country 
×post-euro dummy can distinguish countries adopting euro after 1998. This method is developed by 
Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2008). Besides, to test the macro economic impact, I also put some 
other variables into the regression: changes of exchange rate
1
, GDP growth, log of GDP per capita, 
change of short term interest rate, and term spread. These variables are also from the model of Bris, 
Koskinen, and Nilsson (2008). Detailed figures are provided in the Appendix. 
 
Model 5 and 6 of Table VIII reproduce Model 1 and 2 of Table VIII separately by adding these 
macroeconomic variables and dummies. The adjusted    has been improved by less than 1%. The 
firm-specific variables have similar coefficients and significance as in Model 1 and 2 of Table VIII. 
The coefficient of Euro country×post-euro dummy is negative for both Model 5 and Model 6 of 
Table VIII, which is consistent with my previous study in Data description section that firms in 
countries adopting euro increase their cash ratio to a less degree than firms in countries outside Euro 
zone. Even though the model developed by Bris, Koskinen, and Nilsson (2008) plays an important 
role in explaining the Tobin’s Q ratio, the explanation power of the model is less significant to 
explain the increase in cash ratios.  
 
In summary, Table VIII shows that the relationship between firm characteristics and cash ratios are 
consistent over the models and significant. The cash holdings, when holding other variables 
consistent, of 2000s are higher than in 1980s. But cash holdings in 1990s are not significant in either 
Model 3 or Model 4 of Table VIII. When euro impacts are tested, the coefficients of those 
macroeconomic variables are mostly significant. However, I didn't go further with the analysis since 
the explanation power of the model adds little to the simpler Model 1 and 2 of Table VIII. But the 
                                                          
1 Exchange rate means how much one USD, for instance, can buy one euro. And it’s calculated as one dollar divided by one euro. 
The change of exchange rate is calculated as exchange rate in time (t+1) minus exchange rate in time (t).  
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euro model confirms the previous study that the common currency reduces the incentives for cash 
holdings to certain degree in western European and Nordic countries because currency risk is 
eliminated and costs of capital has also decreased. 
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Table VIII 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependent 
Variable 
Cash/Assets Log(Cash/ 
Net Assets) 
Cash/Assets Log(Cash/ 
Net Assets) 
Cash/Assets Log(Cash/ 
Net Assets) 
Intercept 0.3194878 -0.960665 0.3065924 -1.08383 -0.4223277 -8.299387 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Sigma 0.0108011 0.0767953 0.0106618 0.0751172 0.0106203 0.0737747 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market to book 0.0200739 0.1276609 0.0199669 0.1267308 0.0199481 0.1254646 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Real size -0.0107128 -0.0458881 -0.0102408 -0.0408245 -0.0105002 -0.0434772 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash flow/ assets -0.0558547 -0.3295142 -0.055617 -0.3263515 -0.0532694 -0.303409 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NWC/ assets -0.4029419 -3.978307 -0.3990292 -3.932591 -0.3989132 -3.924462 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capex -0.0933029 -0.7892815 -0.0846052 -0.6904872 -0.0799067 -0.6340257 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.3802313 -3.313392 -0.3803342 -3.309617 -0.3838789 -3.343701 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D/ sales 0.0076013 0.0556279 0.0079056 0.0596524 0.0068301 0.0488784 
 (0.009) (0.026) (0.006) (0.017) (0.019) (0.051) 
Dividenddummy -0.0388761 -0.2482374 -0.0372856 -0.2293063 -0.0373725 -0.2310571 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Acquisitionactivity 0.0004178 0.0003394 0.0004356 0.0005407 0.0004815 0.0009471 
 (0.000) (0.600) (0.000) (0.403) (0.000) (0.149) 
1990s dummy   0.0025769 -0.0044203   
   (0.539) (0.903)   
2000s dummy   0.0123834 0.1179973   
   (0.002) (0.001)   
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GDP growth     -0.0767375 -0.8705524 
     (0.175) (0.074) 
log (GDP 
growth/per capita) 
    0.0701374 0.6948978 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
change of 
exchangerate 
    -0.0119408 -0.1206772 
     (0.010) (0.003) 
Change of short 
term interest rate 
    -0.0046612 -0.0454861 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Termspread     -0.004475 -0.0402126 
     (0.000) (0.000) 
Euro country×post-
euro dummy 
    -0.0096743 -0.098732 
     (0.008) (0.002) 
Adjusted R squred 0.3663 0.3315 0.3669 0.3328 0.3726 0.3395 
47 
 
 
5.2  The slope change in the demand for cash 
Differences in the intercepts could result from changes in the relation between cash holdings and 
firm characteristics. To evaluate whether this is the case, I estimate models in Table IX to allow for 
changes in both the intercept and slope coefficients. The model is as follows: 
 
Cash ratio=α +   Firm Size +  Firm size*dummy 1990s +    Firm size*dummy 2000s + 
  Leverage +   Leverage *dummy 1990s +    Leverage *dummy 2000s+   Dividend Dummy + 
  Dividend Dummy *dummy 1990s +     Dividend Dummy *dummy 2000s+    R&D +    R&D 
*dummy 1990s +     R&D *dummy 2000s+    Acquisitions +    Acquisitions *dummy 1990s +  
   Acquisitions *dummy 2000s+    Capital Expenditures +    Capital Expenditures *dummy 
1990s +     Capital Expenditures *dummy 2000s+    NWC+    NWC *dummy 1990s +  
   NWC *dummy 2000s+    Industry Sigma +    Industry Sigma *dummy 1990s +     Industry 
Sigma *dummy 2000s+    Cash Flow/Assets +    Cash Flow/Assets *dummy 1990s +     Cash 
Flow/Assets *dummy 2000s+    Marker to Book +    Marker to Book *dummy 1990s +  
   Marker to Book *dummy 2000s +   
 
Model 1 of Table IX replicates Model 1 of Table VIII, but with dummy variables that interact with 
all independent variables. Adding the indicator variable increases the adjusted    by less than 1%. 
The number in the parentheses is the p-value. So for the estimates, the coefficients of the variables 
is for data in the 1980s. By adding the coefficients interaction of 1990s and 2000s, the coefficients 
for 1990s and 2000s can be obtained. In general, the absolute value of a coefficient increases over 
time (i.e., the interactions are of the same sign as the coefficient for the whole sample period or the 
sign of the sum of the estimate and interaction is the same as the sign of the estimate for the sample). 
Since the firm data in from 1980s are quite limited, some coefficients of the independent variables 
are not significant anymore. Any some coefficients have different signs from Model 1 in Table VIII. 
Industry sigma, firm size, R&D, and dividend dummy no longer have significant coefficients in the 
Estimate. Besides, cash flow to assets, R&D, dividends, and acquisitions change the sign for this 
sub-sample. Cash flow to assets and acquisitions are significant at 5%.  
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In this estimate, cash flow to assets is positively related to cash ratio in 1980s. The possible 
explanation is that in the 1980s, the sense of shareholder protection was not strong enough to 
influence the behavior of management. Thus, managers could accumulate more cash from the high 
cash flows from daily operations of the firm. The situation gradually changed when shareholders 
rights became more important in the 90s. In the sub-sample, acquisitions are negatively related with 
cash holdings. In previous section, there are both possible relations between acquisitions and cash 
ratios. It could be that, in 1980s, managers would hoard cash rather than use it for acquisitions. 
Thus, acquisitions and cash holdings are negatively related. This explanation from agency problem 
is consistent with the one for cash flow to assets. Thus, I conclude that, in 1980s, shareholder 
protection was less implemented than afterwards for countries in western European and Nordic 
countries.  
 
In interaction 1990s and 2000s in Model 1 of Table IX, the interactions are increasing both for 
1990s and 2000s. Some coefficients change the sign during 1990s and 2000s. However, the 
coefficient for industry sigma is not significant for 1990s. But it’s increasing for 2000s, significant 
at 5%. The result is consistent with previous literature review. The industry volatility could be due 
to new listing effects. Thus, their cash ratios increase over time. Cash flow to assets changes their 
sign in 1990s and 2000s, significant at 1%. This finding is interesting because it seems management 
became more concerned with their cash reserves. When they got more cash from cash flows, they 
tended to disburse the cash to shareholders. Thus, it’s evident that shareholder protection became a 
daily issue on management’s minds. Also, acquisitions and cash holdings became positive in 2000s, 
significant at 1%. I still seek to explain from shareholder protection perspective. To avoid too much 
attention from shareholders and the potential discipline, managers would choose to distribute the 
cash as dividends to shareholders or repurchase of shares from shareholders. However, a more 
beneficial method for managers is to implement acquisitions. Thus, their personal compensation 
could increase in the form of stock options and bonuses. Besides, even their ego could boost after 
the acquisitions even though these investments could destroy values.  
 
Model 2 of Table IX re-produces Model 2 of Table VIII. This model provides a similar result as 
Model 1 of Table IX. However, firm size becomes positively related to cash holdings, significant at 
1%. But it changes sign in 2000s. R&D to sales is negatively related to cash ratio, significant at 
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10%. It seems that, in 1980s, firms invested more on R&D when they had cash in hand. But the 
situation breaks in 2000s.   
 
There are a few implications observed from Table IX. First, intercept has the same sign over the 
1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. So it seems that there is an increasing time trend for cash reserves when 
holding the firm characteristics constant. In Table VIII, the dummy for 1990s is negative. But it 
does not exist anymore in Table IX. Besides, I believe shareholder protection was not very strong in 
1980s as evidence from cash flow to assets and acquisitions have displayed different figures for 
1980s and for 1990s and 2000s.  
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 Table IX  
 
1 2 
Model Cash/Assets log(cash/net assets) 
Dependent Variable Estimate Interaction 1990s Interaction 2000s Estimate Interaction 1990s Interaction 2000s 
Intercept 0.1504421 0.1044568 0.1792709 -2.885355 1.397354 2.019283 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry sigma 0.0009928 -0.0018725 0.0109595 0.0556891 -0.0406563 0.0246319 
 
(0.845) (0.738) (0.034) (0.204) (0.401) (0.582) 
Market to book 0.0143278 0.0014089 0.0066033 0.2378316 -0.1293338 -0.1091554 
 
(0.030) (0.836) (0.322) (0.000) (0.028) (0.058) 
Firmsize -0.0005364 -0.0055867 -0.010811 0.0809053 -0.0682453 -0.1424275 
 
(0.832) (0.042) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Cash flow/assets 0.1684628 -0.267249 -0.2166378 2.963352 -3.63525 -3.243796 
 
(0.044) (0.002) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
NWC/assets -0.3631584 -0.0156471 -0.0361271 -4.118556 -0.0527062 0.3609667 
 
(0.000) (0.653) (0.258) (0.000) (0.861) (0.192) 
Capex -0.130662 0.0040877 0.0633049 -1.199863 0.1616395 0.6277001 
 
(0.027) (0.949) (0.298) (0.019) (0.769) (0.233) 
Leverage -0.1069394 -0.1895203 -0.30688 -1.07734 -2.162352 -2.274372 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D/sales -0.1571661 0.1622769 0.1281562 -2.06374 2.096603 1.92649 
 
(0.230) (0.215) (0.332) (0.069) (0.065) (0.093) 
Dividenddummy 0.0140439 -0.0125975 -0.0590886 0.1829459 -0.1227576 -0.475986 
 
(0.250) (0.340) (0.000) (0.085) (0.284) (0.000) 
Acquisitionactivities -0.0007398 0.0004039 0.001504 -0.0078837 0.0055375 0.0099971 
 
(0.036) (0.297) (0.000) (0.010) (0.098) (0.001) 
       Ajusted R square 0.3803 0.3435 
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5.3  Estimate Fama-MacBeth regressions  
Section 5.2  shows that changes in firm characteristics are the major reason why cash holdings 
increase. In this section, I attribute the increase in cash holdings to changes in specific firm 
characteristics. The process consists of three steps. First, based on the method modified by Bates, 
Kalhe, and Stulz (2008), I implement Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1997) model of 
1980s using Fama-MacBeth regressions. The coefficients of the independent variables are 
calculated as the average annual cross-sectional regressions estimated from 1980 to 1989. Second, I 
compute how actual cash holdings in 1990s and 2000s differ from cash holdings in 1980s. Finally, I 
attribute the increases in predicted cash ratios to changes in firm characteristics. 
 
After calculating ten cross-sectional regressions from 1980 to 1989, I obtained the averaged 
regression formula for prediction. The cross-sectional data is provided in the Appendix. The 
equation is: 
 
Cash ratio= 0.218 - 0.003 Firm Size - 0.223 Leverage+ 0.007 Dividend Dummy + 0.012 R&D -
0.001Acquisitions -0.135 Capital Expenditures - 0.344 NWC - 0.0002 Industry sigma + 0.002 Cash 
flow/Assets + 0.0156 Market to book. 
 
This equation provides the formula to predict cash ratios for 1990s and 2000s using the actual 
figures for the corresponding variables. Table X shows the results of actual and predicted cash 
ratios. For the whole sample, the prediction tends to over-estimate the cash ratios for 1990s and 
under-estimate for 2000s.  The predicted average cash ratio over 1990 to 2009 is 14.6% while the 
actual number is 15.2%. The annual difference between actual and predicted is 0.67%. It seems the 
model, on average, underpredicts the cash ratios, as evident from previous section that there is an 
increasing time trend in cash ratios not explained the firm characteristics.  
 
Then I divide the sample into firms paying dividends and firms not paying dividends. For firms 
paying dividends, the model tends to overpredict the cash ratios for 1990s and underpredict for the 
beginning of 2000s. On average, this model overpredicts cash ratios for firms paying dividends. On 
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the other hand, the model underpredicts cash ratios on average for firms not paying dividends, as 
evident that the averaged difference between actual and predicted cash ratios is positive.  
 
The model predicts a 26% increase in the average cash ratio from 1990 to 2009 for the whole 
sample. How could such a big increase be interpreted? To provide some insight, I will investigate 
how firm characteristics change over time and how the changes influence the cash ratios. Think 
about a firm that has 11% capital expenditure to its total assets for 1980s. The coefficient on capital 
expenditure in the Fama-MacBeth regression is 13.5%.So I expect a cash ratio of 1.9% due to 
capital expenditure (11%*13.5%) for this firm in 1980s. average capital expenditure increases 
during the sample period. For example, average capital expenditure is 10.5% in 1999.  So in 1999, a 
cash ratio of 0.14% could be explained by capital expenditure. Hold other variables constant, the 
average capital expenditure is 0.08 from 1990 to 2009. So during the sample period, I expect a 1.1% 
of cash ratio attributable to capital expenditure (8%*13.5%). In the next section, I will try to 
investigate what causes the increase in cash ratios. 
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Table X 
Predicted Cash Ratios and Their Deviations from Actual Cash Holdings over Time 
This table summarizes the predicted cash ratios of sample firms from 1990 to 2009. Predicted cash holdings for each year are derived from a Fama-MacBeth 
model predicting cash ratios, the coefficients of which are the average coefficients from annual cross-sectional regressions estimated over the period 1980 to 
1989. Estimates from this regression are as follows: cash ratio= 0.218 - 0.003 Firm Size - 0.223 Leverage+ 0.007Dividend Dummy + 0.012 R&D -0.001 
Acquisitions -0.135 Capital Expenditures - 0.344 NWC - 0.0002 Industry cash flow volatility + 0.002 Cash flow/Assets + 0.015 Market to book. The table 
summarizes differences between actual and predicted cash ratios, by year, for the whole sample, and for firms paying and not paying common dividends 
during a particular year. T-statistics summarize the statistical significance of differences between predicted and actual cash ratios for the whole sample and 
each of the observed subsamples independently. Variables are defined in the Appendix.  
 
 
WholeSample FirmsPayingDividend FirmsNotPayingDividend 
Year Predicted Actual 
Actual-
Predicted Predicted Actual 
Actual-
Predicted Predicted Actual 
Actual-
Predicted 
1990 0.1258118 0.1205345 -0.0052773 0.1304714 0.1255459 -0.0049255 0.0926771 0.0950133 0.0023362 
Std.Err. (0.0029261) (0.0031396) 
 
(0.0030167) (0.0034036) 
 
(0.0087701) (0.0079239) 
 1991 0.120587 0.1139382 -0.0066488 0.1258761 0.1211071 -0.004769 0.0911667 0.0854944 -0.0056723 
Std.Err. (0.0027545) (0.0030595) 
 
(0.0029897) (0.00345) 
 
(0.0058968) (0.0063854) 
 1992 0.1241084 0.1135546 -0.0105538 0.1325685 0.1241113 -0.0084572 0.0938567 0.0835141 -0.0103426 
Std.Err. (0.0027419) (0.002974) 
 
(0.0029086) (0.0035524) 
 
(0.0061443) (0.0050934) 
 1993 0.1339331 0.1187327 -0.0152004 0.1409893 0.1315887 -0.0094006 0.1098515 0.0859713 -0.0238802 
Std.Err. (0.0025807) (0.0029416) 
 
(0.0028965) (0.0035693) 
 
(0.0050316) (0.0048287) 
 1994 0.1391803 0.122938 -0.0162423 0.1447156 0.1312677 -0.0134479 0.1144885 0.0952509 -0.0192376 
Std.Err. (0.002358) (0.0029739) 
 
(0.0025479) (0.0033736) 
 
(0.0054398) (0.0061107) 
 1995 0.135588 0.119039 -0.016549 0.140511 0.1268782 -0.0136328 0.1135499 0.0923966 -0.0211533 
Std.Err. (0.0022685) (0.00294) 
 
(0.002348) (0.0033121) 
 
(0.0062155) (0.0061981) 
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1996 0.1414923 0.1275482 -0.0139441 0.1438574 0.1332051 -0.0106523 0.1322336 0.1120419 -0.0201917 
Std.Err. (0.0022607) (0.0028675) 
 
(0.002312) (0.0032304) 
 
(0.006402) (0.00602) 
 1997 0.1434163 0.1383274 -0.0050889 0.1451277 0.1385865 -0.0065412 0.1363003 0.1375945 0.0012942 
Std.Err. (0.0020926) (0.0028883) 
 
(0.0021464) (0.0031271) 
 
(0.0060518) (0.0066407) 
 1998 0.1416238 0.1419193 0.0002955 0.1434432 0.1330787 -0.0103645 0.1347242 0.1647445 0.0300203 
Std.Err. (0.0022363) (0.0028646) 
 
(0.0022922) (0.0030214) 
 
(0.0062552) (0.0066082) 
 1999 0.1470928 0.1555977 0.0085049 0.1450736 0.1402902 -0.0047834 0.1539308 0.1872454 0.0333146 
Std.Err. (0.0024866) (0.0032079) 
 
(0.0025587) (0.0034733) 
 
(0.0066157) (0.0066271) 
 2000 0.1544327 0.1690532 0.0146205 0.1446439 0.1291171 -0.0155268 0.1723965 0.2253036 0.0529071 
Std.Err. (0.0021877) (0.003516) 
 
(0.0025298) (0.0034626) 
 
(0.0039505) (0.0066415) 
 2001 0.1439028 0.1602802 0.0163774 0.1380073 0.1287797 -0.0092276 0.152746 0.1977314 0.0449854 
Std.Err. (0.0018905) (0.0033265) 
 
(0.0023162) (0.0035172) 
 
(0.0031629) (0.0058211) 
 2002 0.1393698 0.1616558 0.022286 0.1374433 0.1402912 0.0028479 0.141606 0.1885639 0.0469579 
Std.Err. (0.0018059) (0.0032526) 
 
(0.0021672) (0.0036764) 
 
(0.0029825) (0.0056348) 
 2003 0.1498626 0.1696875 0.0198249 0.1469762 0.1541397 0.0071635 0.1534861 0.1908709 0.0373848 
Std.Err. (0.0017599) (0.0032729) 
 
(0.0020171) (0.0038947) 
 
(0.0030521) (0.0055807) 
 2004 0.1573094 0.1849076 0.0275982 0.1519435 0.1614475 0.009504 0.1642181 0.2184012 0.0541831 
Std.Err. (0.0016676) (0.0033161) 
 
(0.0019368) (0.0036625) 
 
(0.0028653) (0.0060249) 
 2005 0.1658608 0.2000763 0.0342155 0.1610023 0.1639194 0.0029171 0.1720946 0.2482718 0.0761772 
Std.Err. (0.0016118) (0.0034755) 
 
(0.0018577) (0.0037153) 
 
(0.0027873) (0.0062382) 
 2006 0.1716039 0.2008825 0.0292786 0.164191 0.154881 -0.00931 0.1804155 0.2515585 0.071143 
Std.Err. (0.0015251) (0.0034058) 
 
(0.0018408) (0.0036287) 
 
(0.0024861) (0.0057261) 
 2007 0.1678548 0.1916993 0.0238445 0.1625878 0.1490286 -0.0135592 0.1743206 0.2385998 0.0642792 
Std.Err. (0.0014984) (0.0033216) 
 
(0.0018105) (0.0034992) 
 
(0.0024732) (0.0056283) 
 2008 0.1537059 0.1685366 0.0148307 0.1530518 0.1409943 -0.0120575 0.1544525 0.1955105 0.041058 
Std.Err. (0.0017367) (0.0031553) 
 
(0.0021766) (0.0035489) 
 
(0.0027688) (0.0051163) 
 2009 0.1581187 0.1708631 0.0127444 0.1589846 0.1570629 -0.0019217 0.157131 0.1847651 0.0276341 
Std.Err. (0.001745) (0.0031708) 
 
(0.0020494) (0.0037834) 
 
(0.0029148) (0.0050774) 
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5.4  Variables that impact most on the increase in cash holdings 
First, I use Fama-MacBeth method to predict cash ratios for 2000s. The model is: 
 
Cash ratio= 0.218 - 0.003 Firm Size - 0.223 Leverage+ 0.007Dividend Dummy + 0.012 R&D -
0.001Acquisitions -0.135 Capital Expenditures - 0.344 NWC - 0.0002 Industry sigma + 0.002 Cash 
flow/Assets + 0.015 Market to book 
 
The increase in the cash ratio (dependent variable) is calculated as the difference between the 
average cash ratio from 2000 to 2009 and the average cash ratio for 1980s. The independent 
variables are also calculated in the same manner by subtracting the actual data in 2000s from the 
actual data in 1980s.  
 
 Table XI attributes the increase in the predicted cash ratio to changes in the determinants of that 
ratio. The number in the parentheses is the p-value. We can see regression analysis based on the 
differences of dependent and independent variables. However, the sample of the analysis is reduced 
to 270 because of missing data. However, the table still can shelter some light on the analysis.  
 
Model 1 of Table XI analyses the whole sample. But there is one issue with industry sigma, as 
measured as industry sigma. In my sample, these firms generally stay within the same industry. 
Even though it would be different if the sample size would be larger, my sample would result in a 
difference of 0. So there would be collinearity for this sample. However, I put the absolute value 
instead of the difference of industry sigma in the analysis of Model 1. Model 2 of Table XI deletes 
this collinearity item. The adjusted    is hardly impacted. Still, due to the small sample size, many 
variables have insignificant coefficients. They are firm size, capital expenditure to assets, leverage, 
and R&D to sales. The variables with the biggest absolute value are cash flow to assets, NWC to 
assets, and R&D to sales. The coefficient is significant at 5% for cash flow to assets and 1% for 
NWC to assets. However, R&D to sales is not significant. The general conclusion is consistent with 
Bates, Kalhe, and Stulz (2008), who adopt the sample from the U.S. companies from 1980 to 2006. 
Then I try to put the firms into sub-samples of firms paying dividends and firms not paying 
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dividends. However, in the sample of non-paying firms, there are too much conllearity. So I only 
retain one sample of dividend paying firms. From Model 3 of Table XI, the adjusted    is not 
affected. And it has the same conclusion as in Model 1 and Model 2 of Table XI.  
 
Let’s take a look at the change in the firm characteristics that influence the change of cash ratios 
most. The average NWC to total assets, net of cash, is 13.7% in 1980s. And it decreases to 10.1% in 
2000s. The dramatic 26% change in NWC provides great explanation to the change of cash ratios. 
As more high-tech firms became listed in stock exchanges in the sample period, the average 
inventory decreases since these firms have mostly intangible assets. Besides, as the accounting 
techniques improves, such as SAP and Oracle, firms start to adapt advanced accounting techniques 
to reduce their receivables. Thus, the NWC has decreased over the sample period. 
 
In risk management theories, greater volatility of cash flow increases the present value of 
deadweight costs of financial distress. Normally firms with high cash flow volatility would hedge 
more. However, if firms have unhedgeable risks, they would use cash to buffer the potential shocks, 
as documented in the literature review section. Thus, it’s reasonable for firms experiencing high 
cash flow volatility to hold more cash reserves. In the 1980s, the average cash flow volatility to 
assets is 8%. But it dramatically increased to 16.6% in the 2000s, which is twice the number for 
1980s. 
 
In 1980s, R&D to sales is 3.8% but the number decreases to 9.0% in 2000s. The increase is over 
50%. During the same period, capital expenditure decreases 28% from 10.1% to 7.9%. This contrast 
would indicate that R&D plays a more importance than capital expenditure over time (Bates, Kalhe, 
and Stluz (2009)). A possible explanation is that R&D expenditure is more costly since it puts firms 
at financial distress. Thus, it’s more expensive to access external capital market. So firms prefer to 
hold cash reserves for precautionary purposes. However, capital expenditures result in assets that 
can be used as collaterals. So it can serve as a substitute for cash. The above analysis confirms the 
precautionary motive for the increase of cash holdings and implies that the changes in firm specific 
characteristics largely explain the secular trends of cash reserves.  
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Table V 
Determinants of Changes in Predicted Cash between 1990 to 2009 
This table summarizes the determinants of the change in predicted cash ratios between 1990 and 2009, where 
the change in the cash ratio is measured as the difference between the average cash ratio from 1990 to 2009 
and the average cash ratio from 1980 through 1989. Estimates from this regression are as follows: cash ratio= 
0.218  - 0.003 Firm Size - 0.223 Leverage+ 0.007 Dividend Dummy + 0.012 R&D -0.001 Acquisitions -0.135 
Capital Expenditures - 0.344  NWC - 0.0002 ndustry sigma + 0.002 Cash flow/Assets + 0.015 Market to book 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  Wholesample Exclude Industry sigma Dividend paying firms 
Firmsize -0.001123 -0.0015557 -0.0015501 
 
(0.718) (0.618) (0.621) 
Dividends -0.1056473 -0.1085065 
 
 
(0.065) (0.059) 
 Acquisitions -0.001488 -0.0014196 -0.0014206 
 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010) 
Capex -0.0815465 -0.0796332 -0.0695869 
 
(0.217) (0.23) (0.297) 
Industry sigma 0.0154635 
  
 
(0.06) 
  Cash flow/assets 0.2981101 0.2546257 0.2577097 
 
(0.012) (0.03) (0.029) 
Market to book 0.021413 0.023854 0.0253601 
 
(0.009) (0.004) (0.002) 
NWC/assets -0.2550985 -0.240238 -0.2442252 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D/sales -0.2481951 -0.245925 -0.2436823 
 
(0.159) (0.165) (0.171) 
Leverage -0.0053121 -0.0027457 -0.0017015 
 
(0.786) (0.888) (0.931) 
Adjusted R squared 0.198 0.190 0.190 
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6 Agency problems and growth in cash ratios 
 
The evidence collected so far indicates that empirical models of the demand for cash can explain the 
increase in cash reserves over time primarily through changes of firm specific characteristics. I 
incorporate several proxies in the models to demonstrate the precautionary and transaction motives 
for cash holdings. However, so far, I have not carried out analysis using direct proxies to test the 
effects of agency problems on cash holdings. In this section, I will perform several tests to evaluate 
whether agency problems can explain the increase in cash ratios systematically in the sample. 
 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrics (2003) develop a GIM index to measure managerial entrenchment. 
Specifically, GIM index is a cumulative index of 24 antitakeover governance provisions from the 
Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC) volumes. Firms that have a high value of the GIM 
index are expected to have more entrenched management. GIM index is thoroughly investigated by 
many researchers. Bates, Kalhe, and Stulz (2009) find that the highest increase in cash ratio is not 
related to firms with the greatest GIM index. So there is no evidence to show that entrenched 
management hoards much cash, at least not from the sample provided by IRRC from 1990 to 2006.  
 
Secondly, I examine the value of cash reserves over time. Several recent papers correlate agency 
costs of cash with the value of corporate cash reserves. Pinkowitz and Williamson (2004) modify 
the valuation model initiated by Fama and French (1998) by using cash ratios as an independent 
variable. This model is somehow ad hoc because it does not point out a functional form that is 
derived directly from a theoretical model. However, it does explain a significant amount of cross-
sectional variation in firm values. The basic model of the regression is as follows: 
 
    = α +        +          +           +         +           +          +          +            
+        +          +            +         +          +            +          +     ,   (1) 
 
where    =(    ,   ,    ,   ,   ,and      is the level of variable X in year t divided by the level of 
total assets in year t; d  is the change        level of X from year t-2 to year t,    -     ; d    is 
the change in     level of X from year t to year t+2,      -  ; V is the market value of the firm 
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calculated at fiscal year-end as the sum of the market value of equity and book value of short-term 
and long-term debt; E is earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, deferred tax credits, and 
investment tax credits; A is the total assets, RD is research and development expenditures; I is the 
interest expenses, and D is the common dividends. RD is set as zero if the data is missing.  
 
To analyze the relation between market value and cash holdings in the model, I separate the change 
in assets into its cash and noncash portions based on Bates, Kalhe, and Stulz (2009). The model 
changes into the following: 
 
    = α +        +          +           +          +            +          +          + 
           +        +          +            +         +          +            
+          +       +     ,   (2) 
 
whereNA is net assets defined as total assets minus cash and L corresponds to cash holdings. The 
coefficient on cash holdings determines the value of cash holdings of one euro. If the agency 
problem causes the increase of cash reserves, the value of cash should decrease over time. This 
model has been implemented by Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), using U.S. firms. Now I would 
like to measure the value of cash with western European and Nordic firms.  
 
Table XII reproduces estimates of the regression based on equation (2). Two models are provided in 
the table. Model 1 of Table XII includes all firms in the sample for which the data can be used in 
the regression. Two interaction terms with cash are added to allow the value of cash to change from 
1980s to the 1990s and 2000s. Coefficients on these interaction variables are positive. But two of 
them are not significant. Fama and French (1998) point out that it could be inappropriate to 
incorporate all firms in their model because there is a systematic difference in the cost of equity 
across the sub-samples. It’s possible that costs of equity are different for small firms. So Model 2 of 
Table XII, which replicates Model 1, uses a sub-sample of firms whose assets are over 100 million 
euro in 2004. Then cash and its interactions all have positive and significant coefficients. Besides, 
the explaining power has increase by more than 20%. 
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If cash holdings can be a proxy of agency problem, then the market will present this information in 
the firm’s share price. However, the analysis shows that the market value of the firm is positively 
related to cash holdings. Thus, the agency problem is not proven from my study, at least not for the 
sample firms in western European and Nordic countries. 
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Table XII 
OLS Regression Results for the Market Value of the Firm 
The dependent variable for the regression is the market value of the firm in year t,   . For each independent 
variable X,   is the level in year t, divided by the level of total assets in year t; d  is the change in the level of 
X from year t-2 to year t, divided by total assets in year t((           ); d    is the change in the level of X 
from year t+2 to year t, divided by total assets in year t((           ). The first regression is for the full 
sample of firms that satisfy the data requirements, and for which I am able to calculate 2-year leads and lags. 
The second regression adds additional requirements that assets exceed 100 million euro. Variables are defined 
in the Appendix.  
Model 1 2 
Variable 
  Intercept 0.8863323 0.8989866 
 
(0.003) (0.000) 
   -0.8379181 2.913799 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
   0.0277442 -0.010685 
 
(0.000) (0.194) 
      -0.2961308 1.104692 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
    -2.041559 0.4488626 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
       -4.289514 -0.7010721 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
   0.0000203 0.0787984 
 
(0.971) (0.000) 
    0.0000154 0.0000341 
 
(0.754) (0.142) 
       -0.000022 -0.0013416 
 (0.726) (0.149) 
   0. 0000103 0. 0000452 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
   0. 0001867 0. 0005378 
 
(0.006) (0.000) 
      -0. 000065 -0. 000411 
 
(0.023) (0.009) 
   0.1625652 0.0876307 
 
(0.127) (0.151) 
   0.0000645 0.3027408 
 
(0.965) (0.000) 
      0.1628016 0.8346969 
 
(0.126) (0.000) 
      -0.3724957 -0.8853679 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
   2.245463 1.155829 
 
(0.239) (0.000) 
  ∗     2.535239 0.4507338 
 
(0.220) (0.003) 
  ∗     3.965503 0.7379604 
 
(0.043) (0.000) 
D90s 0.1239922 0.176666 
 (0.711) (0.000) 
D00s 0.2634356 0.1877122 
 (0.417) (0.000) 
Adjusted R spared 0.4223 0.6916 
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7 Conclusion 
The average cash ratio increases significantly for western European and Nordic countries from 1980 
to 2009. The average annual increase is 0.9%. From my study, I notice that firms with the most 
increase in cash ratios are smaller firms, firms not paying dividends, firms with accounting losses, 
and firms with most idiosyncratic risks. After documenting the increase in cash ratio, I investigate 
the reasons for that increase. I use the models developed by Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and 
Williamson (1999) and Bates, Kalhe, and Stulz (2008) to analyze western European and Nordic 
countries.  
 
The major causes for the increase in cash ratios are decrease in net working capital, increase in cash 
flow risks, and increase in research and development expenditures. While the contribution of 
changes in these firm specific characteristics to the overall increase in cash reserves varies across 
alternative empirical models of cash holdings, my conclusion is generally robust. 
 
The increase in cash flow risks is connected to the widely studied increase in idiosyncratic risk. 
Brandt, Brav, Graham, and Kumar (2009) suggest that the recent decrease in idiosyncratic risk 
should lead firms to eventually decrease their cash reserves. Even though their study is based on US 
firms, cash reserves also decrease in my sample, with a peak in 2005, for firms in western European 
and Nordic countries.  
 
Besides, research and development expenditures have demonstrated an important role comparing to 
capital expenditures in the increase of cash ratios. More and more high-tech companies became 
publicly traded despite the crash of bubbles of Internet firms in the beginning of 2000s. AT&T, 
Teleponica, and Nippon Telegraph are Top 50 on Forbes 500 in 2010. With fewer tangible assets, 
these firms invest more on R&D to pursue their competitive advantage. However, it’s expensive to 
finance these projects from external capital market. As a result, greater R&D intense firms have to 
hold relatively more internally generated cash to buffer their potential cash shocks. 
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The evidence from my paper shows that the increase in cash ratios can largely be interpreted by the 
changes in firm characteristics in the sample. The change in the relation between firm 
characteristics and cash holdings attributes an insignificant role in the increase of cash reserves. The 
analysis is consistent with current papers that the precautionary motive for cash holdings is vital for 
firms that increase the cash reserves. Even if the market has developed many advanced derivatives 
to hedge potential risks for firms, there are still many risks that cannot be hedged fully. Besides, 
some firms find it too expensive to hedge the risks and simply reluctant to hedge. So cash reserves 
could substitute the hedging derivatives to defend the un-foreseeable risks.  
 
There is considerable amount of cross-sectional variation in cash holdings that cannot be explained 
by my model. Thus, I would contribute this un-explained portion to agency problems. However, the 
tricky part for agency problem is that the issue shows somehow distinctively different role in 
different models. Agency problems seem not capable of explaining the aggregate increase in cash 
holdings, as evident from the model developed by Fama and French (1998). Consequently, I would 
like to see more advanced and convincing models that could provide better insight in this issue. And 
I hope more papers can contribute new understanding in the agency problems between shareholders 
and management.  
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9 Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Acquisitionactivity The ratio of expenditures on acquisition relative to the book value of total assets 
Capex The ratio of capital expenditures to the book value of total assets 
Cash flow EBITDA-interest-taxes-common dividend 
cashratio The ratio of cash and marketable securities to the book value of total assets 
Dividenddummy A dummy variable equal to one if the firm paid dividend in that year, and zero if it did not 
Industry sigma The mean of the standard deviations of cash flow/assets over 10 years for firms in the same industry, as defined by the two-digit SIC code 
Leverage The ratio of total debt to the book value of total assets, where debt includes long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities 
Market to book Measured as (book value of total assets – book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets 
Net Leverage Calculated as the difference between total debt and cash and marketable securities, divided by the book value of total assets 
NWC Calculated as net working capital minus cash and marketable securities 
Firmsize The natural log of the book value of total assets in 2004 dollars 
Tobin’s Q (Market value of common equity   + Total assets  – Book value of common equity) ÷ Total assets 
R&D/sales The ratio of research and development expense to sales 
C Cash and marketablesecurities 
D  Common dividends 
E Earnings, calculated as earnings before extraordinary items + interest + income statement deferred tax credits + investment tax credits 
I  Interestexpense 
M  Market value of equity + short-term debt + long-term debt 
NA Net assets, calculated as book value of total assets – cash 
RD Research and development expense or zero when missing 
GDP growth Annual real growth rate in GDP 
GDP/capita Real GDP per capita, expressed in euros. 
Short-term interest 
rate term spread 
Six-month Treasury bill yield. (Source: Economist Intelligence Unit). Difference in yields between the ten-year government bond and the 
six-month Treasury bill. 
Inflationrate The inflation rate as measured by the annual change in CPI. 
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10 Appendix 2: GDP Growth Per Capita 
Time AT BE DK FI FR DE IE IT LU NL NO PT ES SE SZ UK 
1980 1.78 4.48 -0.49 5.37 1.69 1.41 3.08 3.43 0.84 3.25 4.5 4.59 2.21 1.7 4.6 -2.09 
1981 -0.14 -0.28 -0.89 1.29 0.92 0.53 3.33 0.84 -0.55 -0.78 1.55 1.62 -0.13 -0.2 1.6 -1.22 
1982 1.95 0.59 3.71 3.04 2.43 -0.39 2.28 0.41 1.13 -1.24 0.13 2.14 1.25 1.2 -1.31 2.2 
1983 2.95 0.31 2.65 3.02 1.19 1.57 -0.24 1.17 2.99 2.07 3.87 -0.17 1.77 1.8 0.64 3.69 
1984 0.06 2.47 4.17 3.11 1.48 2.82 4.35 3.23 6.19 3.06 5.89 -1.88 1.78 4.3 3.01 2.69 
1985 2.46 1.65 4.02 3.3 1.71 2.33 3.09 2.8 2.79 2.58 5.35 2.81 2.32 2.2 3.67 3.62 
1986 2.32 1.82 4.95 2.64 2.45 2.29 -0.43 2.86 9.98 2.79 4.04 4.14 3.25 2.9 1.86 4.01 
1987 1.35 2.31 0.29 3.49 2.49 1.4 4.66 3.19 3.95 1.93 1.78 6.38 5.55 3.5 1.59 4.56 
1988 2.87 4.72 -0.14 5.22 4.6 3.71 5.22 4.19 8.46 3.44 -0.17 7.49 5.09 2.7 3.28 5.03 
1989 3.74 3.47 0.57 5.06 4.16 3.9 5.81 3.39 9.8 4.42 1 6.44 4.83 2.8 4.33 2.28 
1990 4.17 3.14 1.61 0.53 2.64 5.26 8.47 2.05 5.32 4.18 1.93 3.95 3.78 1 3.67 0.78 
1991 3.34 1.83 1.3 -6.01 1.02 5.11 1.93 1.53 8.64 2.44 3.1 4.37 2.55 -1.1 -0.95 -1.39 
1992 1.89 1.53 1.98 -3.49 1.37 2.23 3.34 0.77 1.82 1.71 3.52 1.09 0.93 -1.2 0.1 0.15 
1993 0.37 -0.96 -0.09 -0.8 -0.91 -0.8 2.69 -0.89 4.2 1.26 2.79 -2.04 -1.03 -2.07 -0.19 2.22 
1994 2.21 3.23 5.53 3.62 2.22 2.66 5.76 2.15 3.82 2.96 5.05 0.96 2.38 4.01 1.19 4.28 
1995 2.54 2.38 3.07 3.96 2.12 1.89 9.63 2.83 1.43 3.12 4.19 4.28 2.76 3.94 0.35 3.05 
1996 2.23 1.41 2.83 3.58 1.11 0.99 8.14 1.1 1.52 3.41 5.1 3.66 2.42 1.61 0.63 2.89 
1997 2.13 3.74 3.2 6.2 2.24 1.8 11.46 1.87 5.94 4.28 5.39 4.38 3.87 2.71 2.08 3.31 
1998 3.6 1.93 2.16 5.02 3.5 2.03 8.43 1.4 6.49 3.92 2.68 5.05 4.47 4.2 2.64 3.61 
1999 3.34 3.54 2.56 3.9 3.3 2.01 10.9 1.46 8.42 4.68 2.03 4.08 4.75 4.66 1.31 3.47 
2000 3.65 3.68 3.53 5.34 3.91 3.21 9.71 3.69 8.44 3.94 3.25 3.93 5.05 4.45 3.58 3.92 
2001 0.52 0.79 0.7 2.29 1.85 1.24 5.7 1.82 2.52 1.93 1.99 1.97 3.65 1.26 1.15 2.46 
2002 1.65 1.37 0.47 1.82 1.03 0 6.55 0.45 4.11 0.08 1.5 0.71 2.7 2.48 0.44 2.1 
2003 0.8 0.79 0.38 2 1.09 -0.22 4.41 -0.02 1.55 0.34 1.01 -0.93 3.1 2.34 -0.2 2.81 
2004 2.54 3.23 2.3 4.11 2.47 1.21 4.6 1.53 4.4 2.24 3.86 1.56 3.27 4.23 2.53 2.95 
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2005 2.46 1.71 2.45 2.92 1.9 0.75 6.02 0.66 5.43 2.05 2.74 0.76 3.61 3.16 2.64 2.17 
2006 3.6 2.69 3.39 4.41 2.22 3.37 5.32 2.04 4.97 3.39 2.28 1.44 4.02 4.3 3.63 2.79 
2007 3.73 2.92 1.58 5.33 2.37 2.66 5.63 1.48 6.64 3.92 2.73 2.39 3.57 3.31 3.64 2.68 
2008 2.18 1 -1.12 0.92 0.22 0.99 -3.55 -1.32 1.44 1.88 0.75 0.02 0.86 -0.61 1.9 -0.07 
2009 -3.89 -2.75 -5.21 -8.2 -2.63 -4.72 -7.58 -5.04 -3.66 -3.92 -1.43 -2.49 -3.72 -5.33 -1.91 -4.87 
 
 
* All the below appendixes are from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home 
* The abbreviations of the first row represents the countries as follows:  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. 
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11 Appenidx 3: GDP 
Time AT BE DK FI FR DE IE IT LU NL NO PT ES SE SZ UK 
1980 19209 18885 18922 16763 18058 17572 11276 17395 24239 19437 21526 9990 12951 19492 25774 16176 
1981 19133 18834 18761 16908 18122 17639 11509 17518 24039 19151 21784 10065 12854 19430 26008 15971 
1982 19491 18950 19473 17325 18453 17588 11646 17580 24298 18827 21732 10216 12945 19651 25516 16342 
1983 20099 19013 20005 17741 18574 17913 11535 17779 25017 19142 22501 10155 13112 19995 25621 16938 
1984 20113 19480 20851 18196 18759 18484 11955 18348 26543 19653 23758 9930 13292 20835 26297 17365 
1985 20597 19798 21681 18720 18985 18958 12283 18856 27240 20069 24952 10186 13551 21260 27146 17948 
1986 21061 20155 22723 19151 19353 19386 12227 19394 29821 20517 25872 10608 13949 21825 27484 18626 
1987 21331 20597 22758 19764 19728 19650 12793 20011 30799 20775 26207 11304 14686 22513 27725 19435 
1988 21912 21495 22712 20736 20517 20275 13506 20841 33119 21350 26025 12182 15401 23017 28409 20372 
1989 22630 22161 22834 21706 21246 20915 14377 21531 36008 22164 26173 13007 16113 23503 29412 20779 
1990 23395 22792 23164 21725 21691 21823 15612 21954 37497 22936 26589 13573 16697 23555 30164 20882 
1991 23935 23121 23438 20304 21803 22760 15823 22269 40191 23306 27279 14206 17092 23139 29515 20519 
1992 24120 23379 23786 19488 21993 23091 16219 22433 40369 23526 28082 14367 17210 22727 29276 20497 
1993 24012 23065 23682 19240 21700 22741 16567 22220 41473 23653 28691 14057 16996 22126 29030 20905 
1994 24449 23739 24909 19845 22100 23275 17462 22693 42439 24210 29966 14159 17369 22852 29176 21744 
1995 25031 24254 25555 20555 22489 23646 19063 23334 42531 24837 31070 14717 17823 23628 29096 22345 
1996 25555 24552 26119 21221 22660 23812 20474 23583 42634 25574 32484 15214 18211 23971 29177 22935 
1997 26069 25409 26837 22472 23087 24196 22605 24012 44595 26529 34049 15829 18866 24606 29750 23632 
1998 26976 25840 27324 23540 23810 24694 24157 24342 46885 27402 34749 16565 19640 25627 30456 24417 
1999 27823 26706 27929 24402 24479 25173 26500 24694 50136 28493 35215 17169 20466 26799 30705 25175 
2000 28770 27624 28822 25651 25272 25949 28695 25594 53646 29406 36126 17749 21320 27948 31618 26071 
2001 28809 27747 28923 26177 25557 26222 29864 26044 54373 29746 36665 17980 21850 28225 31648 26610 
2002 29139 27993 28955 26587 25634 26177 31268 26079 55996 29577 37003 17976 22119 28832 31538 27072 
2003 29242 28096 28990 27056 25732 26108 32115 25873 56183 29537 37165 17684 22429 29397 31212 27723 
2004 29798 28882 29585 28092 26176 26430 33011 26011 57847 30099 38382 17856 22789 30519 31792 28404 
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2005 30324 29217 30219 28814 26474 26641 34218 25989 60069 30638 39169 17910 23228 31358 32426 28832 
2006 31253 29807 31141 29963 26875 27571 35183 26368 62068 31631 39727 18108 23794 32522 33353 29466 
2007 32289 30450 31501 31427 27347 28339 36275 26563 65140 32797 40422 18498 24202 33226 34292 30058 
2008 32852 30509 30966 31570 27252 28669 34378 26013 64958 33288 40196 18477 24025 32762 34524 29837 
2009 31475 29445 29193 28841 26391 27398 31593 24525 61422 31817 39122 18000 22961 30733 33481 28201 
 
 
 
* All the below appendixes are from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home 
* The abbreviations of the first row represents the countries as follows:  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. 
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12 Appenidx 4: Long Term Interest Rates 
Time AT BE DK FI FR DE IE IT LU NL NO PT ES SE SZ UK 
1980 .. 11.90 .. .. 13.78 8.43 15.35 .. .. 10.21 .. .. 15.96 .. 4.76 13.91 
1981 .. 13.44 .. .. 16.29 10.13 17.27 .. .. 11.55 .. .. 15.81 .. 5.57 14.88 
1982 .. 13.43 .. .. 16.00 8.91 17.06 .. .. 10.10 .. .. 15.99 .. 4.60 13.09 
1983 .. 11.94 .. .. 14.37 8.08 13.90 .. .. 8.61 .. .. 16.91 .. 4.17 11.27 
1984 .. 12.24 .. .. 13.40 7.96 14.61 .. .. 8.33 .. .. 16.52 .. 4.55 11.13 
1985 .. 10.97 .. .. 11.87 7.04 12.78 .. .. 7.33 12.91 .. 13.37 .. 4.70 10.97 
1986 .. 8.63 .. .. 9.12 6.16 11.22 .. .. 6.32 13.30 .. 11.35 .. 4.23 10.14 
1987 .. 8.18 11.28 .. 9.48 6.25 11.26 .. .. 6.40 13.31 .. 12.81 11.68 4.03 9.57 
1988 .. 8.01 9.88 10.56 9.08 6.49 9.36 .. .. 6.42 12.90 .. 11.74 11.35 4.02 9.68 
1989 .. 8.59 9.71 12.09 8.80 7.03 9.17 .. .. 7.22 10.83 .. 13.60 11.18 5.20 10.19 
1990 8.73 10.06 10.63 13.21 9.93 8.71 10.27 .. .. 8.92 10.68 .. 14.68 13.16 6.45 11.80 
1991 8.55 9.31 9.26 11.71 9.04 8.46 9.37 .. .. 8.74 10.00 .. 12.36 10.69 6.24 10.11 
1992 8.14 8.66 8.99 11.97 8.59 7.85 9.32 13.27 .. 8.10 9.61 .. 11.70 10.02 6.40 9.06 
1993 6.71 7.22 7.30 8.83 6.78 6.52 7.58 11.19 .. 6.36 6.88 .. 10.21 8.54 4.55 7.48 
1994 7.03 7.70 7.83 9.04 7.22 6.88 8.04 10.52 7.15 6.87 7.44 10.48 10.00 9.50 4.96 8.12 
1995 7.13 7.38 8.27 8.79 7.54 6.86 8.23 12.21 7.23 6.90 7.42 11.47 11.27 10.24 4.52 8.20 
1996 6.32 6.30 7.19 7.08 6.31 6.23 7.25 9.40 6.30 6.15 6.77 8.56 8.74 8.03 4.00 7.81 
1997 5.68 5.59 6.26 5.96 5.58 5.66 6.26 6.86 5.60 5.58 5.89 6.36 6.40 6.61 3.36 7.05 
1998 4.71 4.70 5.04 4.79 4.64 4.58 4.75 4.88 4.73 4.63 5.40 4.88 4.83 4.99 3.04 5.55 
1999 4.68 4.71 4.92 4.72 4.61 4.50 4.77 4.73 4.67 4.63 5.50 4.78 4.73 4.98 3.04 5.09 
2000 5.56 5.57 5.66 5.48 5.39 5.27 5.48 5.58 5.52 5.41 6.22 5.60 5.53 5.37 3.93 5.33 
2001 5.08 5.06 5.09 5.04 4.94 4.80 5.02 5.19 4.86 4.96 6.24 5.16 5.12 5.11 3.38 4.93 
2002 4.97 4.89 5.06 4.98 4.86 4.78 4.99 5.03 4.68 4.89 6.38 5.01 4.96 5.30 3.20 4.90 
2003 4.15 4.15 4.31 4.14 4.13 4.07 4.13 4.30 3.32 4.12 5.05 4.18 4.13 4.64 2.66 4.53 
2004 4.15 4.06 4.30 4.11 4.10 4.04 4.06 4.26 2.84 4.10 4.37 4.14 4.10 4.43 2.74 4.88 
2005 3.39 3.37 3.40 3.35 3.41 3.35 3.32 3.56 2.41 3.37 3.75 3.44 3.39 3.38 2.10 4.41 
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2006 3.80 3.81 3.81 3.78 3.80 3.76 3.79 4.05 3.30 3.78 4.08 3.91 3.78 3.70 2.52 4.50 
2007 4.30 4.33 4.29 4.29 4.30 4.22 4.33 4.49 0.00 4.29 4.77 4.42 4.31 4.17 2.93 5.01 
2008 4.36 4.40 4.28 4.29 4.23 3.98 4.55 4.68 0.00 4.23 4.46 4.52 4.36 3.89 2.90 4.59 
2009 3.94 3.82 3.59 3.74 3.65 3.22 5.23 4.31 0.00 3.69 4.00 4.21 3.97 3.25 2.20 3.65 
 
 
 
* All the below appendixes are from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home 
* The abbreviations of the first row represents the countries as follows:  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. 
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13 Appendix 5: Short Term Interest Rates 
Time AT BE DK FI FR DE IE IT LU NL NO PT ES SE SZ UK 
1980 .. 14.03 .. .. 12.21 9.54 .. 16.79 .. .. 12.23 .. 16.52 .. 5.77 16.62 
1981 .. 15.27 .. .. 15.26 12.11 .. 19.23 .. .. 13.13 .. 16.18 .. 9.10 13.91 
1982 .. 13.97 .. .. 14.62 8.88 .. 19.91 .. .. 15.37 .. 16.28 13.25 5.06 12.29 
1983 .. 10.40 .. .. 12.47 5.78 .. 18.31 .. .. 13.30 .. 20.05 11.41 4.09 10.13 
1984 .. 11.42 .. .. 11.70 5.99 13.23 17.27 .. .. 13.02 .. 14.90 11.93 4.35 9.94 
1985 .. 9.52 .. .. 9.94 5.45 11.93 15.25 .. .. 12.53 .. 12.22 14.17 4.92 12.24 
1986 .. 8.08 .. .. 7.71 4.64 12.52 13.39 .. 5.68 14.39 .. 11.66 9.83 4.22 10.94 
1987 .. 7.05 10.11 10.03 8.27 4.03 10.83 11.33 .. 5.36 14.71 .. 15.82 9.39 3.77 9.70 
1988 .. 6.73 8.48 9.97 7.94 4.33 8.05 10.82 .. 4.82 13.51 .. 11.65 10.08 3.08 10.33 
1989 .. 8.80 9.59 12.56 9.40 7.12 10.04 12.62 .. 7.39 11.38 .. 15.04 11.50 7.32 13.89 
1990 8.96 9.63 10.90 14.00 10.32 8.49 11.31 12.23 .. 8.68 11.54 .. 15.15 13.67 8.92 14.77 
1991 9.46 9.38 9.70 13.08 9.62 9.25 10.43 12.21 .. 9.28 10.56 .. 13.23 11.59 8.21 11.52 
1992 9.46 9.37 11.02 13.25 10.34 9.52 14.32 14.01 .. 9.35 11.83 16.71 13.34 12.86 7.85 9.62 
1993 7.02 8.22 10.42 7.77 8.59 7.30 9.12 10.20 .. 6.85 7.27 13.25 11.69 8.35 4.91 5.94 
1994 5.12 5.70 6.13 5.35 5.85 5.36 5.93 8.51 .. 5.18 5.85 11.11 8.01 7.40 4.19 5.50 
1995 4.57 4.78 6.07 5.75 6.58 4.53 6.25 10.46 .. 4.37 5.48 9.79 9.36 8.75 2.95 6.68 
1996 3.37 3.22 3.87 3.63 3.94 3.31 5.42 8.82 .. 3.00 4.89 7.37 7.50 5.79 2.02 6.03 
1997 3.50 3.44 3.66 3.23 3.46 3.33 6.09 6.88 .. 3.33 3.73 5.74 5.37 4.11 1.64 6.83 
1998 3.60 3.56 4.14 3.57 3.56 3.54 5.43 4.99 .. 3.46 5.79 4.31 4.24 4.19 1.55 7.34 
1999 2.96 2.96 3.30 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96 2.96 6.54 2.96 2.96 3.12 1.41 5.45 
2000 4.39 4.39 4.90 4.39 4.39 4.39 4.39 4.39 4.39 4.39 6.75 4.39 4.39 3.95 3.17 6.11 
2001 4.26 4.26 4.62 4.26 4.26 4.26 4.26 4.26 4.26 4.26 7.23 4.26 4.26 4.03 2.86 4.97 
2002 3.32 3.32 3.48 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.32 3.32 6.91 3.32 3.32 4.07 1.13 3.99 
2003 2.33 2.33 2.38 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33 4.10 2.33 2.33 3.03 0.33 3.67 
2004 2.11 2.11 2.14 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.11 2.01 2.11 2.11 2.11 0.48 4.57 
2005 2.18 2.18 2.17 2.18 2.18 2.18 2.18 2.18 2.18 2.18 2.21 2.18 2.18 1.72 0.81 4.70 
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2006 3.08 3.08 3.13 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.10 3.08 3.08 2.33 1.56 4.80 
2007 4.28 4.28 4.32 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.28 4.96 4.28 4.28 3.55 2.57 5.96 
2008 4.63 4.63 4.87 4.63 4.63 4.63 4.63 4.63 4.63 4.63 6.22 4.63 4.63 3.91 2.48 5.49 
2009 1.23 1.23 1.81 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 1.23 2.46 1.23 1.23 0.40 0.36 1.20 
 
 
 
* All the below appendixes are from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home 
* The abbreviations of the first row represents the countries as follows:  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. 
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14 Appendix 6: Exchange Rate of US Dollar to Local Currency 
Time AT BE DK FI FR DE IE IT LU NL NO PT ES SE SZ UK Euro 
1980 0.94 0.72 5.64 0.63 0.64 0.93 0.62 0.44 0.72 0.90 4.94 0.25 0.43 4.23 1.68 0.43 .. 
1981 1.16 0.92 7.12 0.73 0.83 1.16 0.79 0.59 0.92 1.13 5.74 0.31 0.55 5.06 1.96 0.50 .. 
1982 1.24 1.13 8.33 0.81 1.00 1.24 0.89 0.70 1.13 1.21 6.45 0.40 0.66 6.28 2.03 0.57 .. 
1983 1.31 1.27 9.15 0.94 1.16 1.31 1.02 0.78 1.27 1.30 7.30 0.55 0.86 7.67 2.10 0.66 .. 
1984 1.45 1.43 10.36 1.01 1.33 1.46 1.17 0.91 1.43 1.46 8.16 0.73 0.97 8.27 2.35 0.75 .. 
1985 1.50 1.47 10.60 1.04 1.37 1.51 1.20 0.99 1.47 1.51 8.60 0.85 1.02 8.60 2.46 0.78 .. 
1986 1.11 1.11 8.09 0.85 1.06 1.11 0.94 0.77 1.11 1.11 7.39 0.75 0.84 7.12 1.80 0.68 .. 
1987 0.92 0.93 6.84 0.74 0.92 0.92 0.85 0.67 0.93 0.92 6.74 0.70 0.74 6.34 1.49 0.61 .. 
1988 0.90 0.91 6.73 0.70 0.91 0.90 0.83 0.67 0.91 0.90 6.52 0.72 0.70 6.13 1.46 0.56 .. 
1989 0.96 0.98 7.31 0.72 0.97 0.96 0.90 0.71 0.98 0.96 6.90 0.79 0.71 6.45 1.64 0.61 .. 
1990 0.83 0.83 6.19 0.64 0.83 0.83 0.77 0.62 0.83 0.83 6.26 0.71 0.61 5.92 1.39 0.56 .. 
1991 0.85 0.85 6.40 0.68 0.86 0.85 0.79 0.64 0.85 0.85 6.48 0.72 0.62 6.05 1.43 0.57 .. 
1992 0.80 0.80 6.04 0.75 0.81 0.80 0.75 0.64 0.80 0.80 6.21 0.67 0.62 5.82 1.41 0.57 .. 
1993 0.85 0.86 6.48 0.96 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.81 0.86 0.84 7.09 0.80 0.76 7.78 1.48 0.67 .. 
1994 0.83 0.83 6.36 0.88 0.85 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.83 0.83 7.06 0.83 0.81 7.72 1.37 0.65 .. 
1995 0.73 0.73 5.60 0.73 0.76 0.73 0.79 0.84 0.73 0.73 6.34 0.75 0.75 7.13 1.18 0.63 0.76 
1996 0.77 0.77 5.80 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.77 0.77 6.45 0.77 0.76 6.71 1.24 0.64 0.79 
1997 0.89 0.89 6.60 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.84 0.88 0.89 0.89 7.07 0.87 0.88 7.63 1.45 0.61 0.88 
1998 0.90 0.90 6.70 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 7.55 0.90 0.90 7.95 1.45 0.60 0.89 
1999 0.94 0.94 6.98 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 7.80 0.94 0.94 8.26 1.50 0.62 0.94 
2000 1.09 1.09 8.08 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 8.80 1.09 1.09 9.16 1.69 0.66 1.09 
2001 1.12 1.12 8.32 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 8.99 1.12 1.12 10.33 1.69 0.69 1.12 
2002 1.06 1.06 7.89 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 7.98 1.06 1.06 9.74 1.56 0.67 1.06 
2003 0.89 0.89 6.59 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 7.08 0.89 0.89 8.09 1.35 0.61 0.89 
2004 0.81 0.81 5.99 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 6.74 0.81 0.81 7.35 1.24 0.55 0.81 
2005 0.80 0.80 6.00 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 6.44 0.80 0.80 7.47 1.25 0.55 0.80 
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2006 0.80 0.80 5.95 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 6.41 0.80 0.80 7.38 1.25 0.54 0.80 
2007 0.73 0.73 5.44 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 5.86 0.73 0.73 6.76 1.20 0.50 0.73 
2008 0.68 0.68 5.10 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 5.64 0.68 0.68 6.59 1.08 0.54 0.68 
2009 0.72 0.72 5.36 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.72 6.29 0.72 0.72 7.65 1.09 0.64 0.72 
2010 0.76 0.76 5.62 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 6.04 0.76 0.76 7.21 1.04 0.65 0.76 
 
 
 
* All the below appendixes are from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home 
* The abbreviations of the first row represents the countries as follows:  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. 
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